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Preface

This short treatise on one aspect of Confederate
diplomacy is the result of a pleasant synthesis of
interests in United States history.

The author's

personal interest in American foreign relations and his
recent involvement in Civil War studies contributed to
the selection of the thesis topic.
The paper is the extension of research originally
initiated under the supervision of Professor

w.

Harrison

Daniel, to whom the author wishes to extend appreciation
for a current and developing interest in Civil War
history.
The author expresses deep appreciation to
Assistant Frofessor Ernest

c.

Bolt, Jr., who not only

has carefully directed the completion of this thesis
but who has increased the author's awareness and
interest in matters of American Diplomatic History.
Finally, the author commends the patience and
assistance of his wife, Carolyn, whose understanding
attitude consistently eased the burdens of graduate
study.

INTRODUCTION
During the secession movement of JanuaryFebruary, 1861, which culminated in the Montgomery
Constitutional Convention, the young Confederate
government established well-defined policy objectives
for the purpose of securing European allies and material
assistance.

Basically these aims were three-fold:

to

secure recognition of the sovereign status of the
Confederate otates; to induce intervention by the
European powers on the side of the Confederacy; and,
after April, 1861, to gain a repudiation of the Union
blockade from these same powers.

Relying predominantly

on the coercive power of cotton, the South began its
quest for these objectives with diplomatic efforts directed at the leading European commercial nations.
Great Britain immediately became the focal
point of the diplomatic ventures.

Since Britain stood

to be the most affected by any severe interruption of
the cotton supply, the Confederates decided that all
possible pressures should be put on her to sharpen her
awareness of this fact ana to lure her to economic
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security through alliance with the cotton capital of
the world, the Confederate States.
Despite the clear definition of Confederate
foreign policy aims, the initial Southern mission to
Britain and the Continent revealed the great disparity
between diplomatic theory and diplomatic performance.
The activities of William Lowndes Yancey, Pierre A.
Rost, and Ambrose Dudley Mann, the first Southern
envoys to Europe, were constantly suppressed by the
inadequate formation and execution of their diplomatic
instructions.
It ie on ·this matter of Southern policy formation
and implementation that the author assumes disagreement
with the heretofore definitive work on Confederate
foreign relations, Frank L. Owsley's King Ootton Diplomacy.
Professor Owsley has written a massive and scholarly
contribution to the history of Southern diplomacy.
Yet, through his total reliance on the theme of cotton,
he has ignored or discarded as irrelevant those factors
which would challenge the unanimity of Southern support
behind the ''cotton famine" policy of Jefferson Davia.
As a result, Owsley has entered an explanation for the
failure of cotton diplomacy based on the ineptitude of
the Gonf ederate envoys and the pressures of external
conditions rather than on the basic policy itself.
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Through the benefit of subsequent scholarship
and the convenient acquisition of primary materials, the
author intends to present a more thorough and objective
analysis of the Yancey-Rost-Mann mission.

Although, as

Owsley and others admit, external factors arose to frustrate the Southern overtures, more often than not, the
grounds for the failure rested with the Confederates
themselves.

As the author proposes to demonstrate, the

failures of the first Southern mission to

~'urope

origi-

nated not with the commissioners, or Union counterdiplomacy, or even in European neutrality, but with the
inadequate, restrictive policy upon which the Confederate
representatives relied.
During the commission's European appointment,
March, 1861. to January, 1862, many of the principal
domestic and foreign crises of the Civil War took place.
From the capture of Fort Sumter and Lincoln's declaration of a state of internal insurrection to the institution of the Northern blockade, First Manassas, and the
Trent affair, the ministers gauged the climate of'
European opinion in expectation of some favorable commitment to the Confederate cause.

Though personally opti-

mistic in the power of cotton and confident in the
righteousness of the

~outhern

action, the commissioners

operated in a predominantly hostile atmosphere where
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their apparent allies were the political opportunists
and economic speculators of England and France.
This paper, then, attempts to investigate ana
evaluate Confederate foreign policy through the YanceyRost-M.ann mission to Great Britain.

The approach is

largely chronological, although there is some topical
presentation.

The basic intent of the study is to

examine the f ounaation ana formation of Southern foreign
policy, the actual operation and strategy of the YanoeyHost-Mann mission, and finally, the failures and
inadequacies of the policy both in execution and in
theory.

CHAPTER I
THE

CHAL~NGE

OF KING COTTON

In the very first line of his standard monograph
on the foreign relations of the Confederate States of
America, King Cotton Diplomacy,

Profe~sor

Frank L. Owsley

states unequivocally that cotton was the foundation of
the Confederacy. 1

No truer yet more obvious summation

has been made of the basis of Southern social and economic life, and eventually, of Confederate diplomacy.
Yet Owsley, through his unfailing devotion to the theme
of cotton, would have us believe that there not only
was complete unanimity within the

~outh

in regard to

the power of cotton but also total accord concerning
the specific use of cotton to achieve the Confederate
diplomatic aims.
By 1861, a universal Bouthern confidence and

1Frank L. Owsley, K!.ng Cotton Diplomacy (Revised edition,
Chicago: 1959), 1. Although the author is in disagree-

ment with Owsley concerning the formation of Confederate
foreign policy, he does not intend this paper to be merely
a refutation of some aspects of King Cotton Diplomacy.
In questioning the conclusiveness and reliability of some
of Owsley's explanations, the author only intends to
demonstrate that there iu room for much clarification in
certain areas of Confederate diplomacy.
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awareness in the power of cotton definitely existed.

What

did not exist was complete harmony among Southern leaders
over the actual employment of cotton as an international
allurement.

Through his conspicuous omission of evidence

concerning the formation of Confederate foreign policy,
Owsley would have us falsely accept the existence among
the

~outhern

policymakers of a total concordance in

regards to both diplomatic tactics and objectives.

It

is the formation of policy, rather than the basis for
the policy, which deserves reconsiaeration.

Before

taking up the matter of actual policy formation, however,
it is necessary to understand the policy basis -- cotton.

On March 4, 1858, amidst the feverish debates
and

bitter quarrels in the United States Senate over

the Kansas situation and especially over the Lecompton
Constitution and its validity, Senator M. B. Hammond of
South Carolina challenged the North and the world to adhere to the power of Southern cotton.

In ringing tones

he accented the strength of Southern cotton and its
controlling influence in world economic circles.

He

concluded by asserting that cotton was too formidable a

foe for the North, or anyone.

"Cotton is king," spoke

Hammond, and "no power on earth dares to make war

7
upon it." 2
The origins of this philosophy, so passionately

and confidently spoken by Hammond and echoed throughout
the entire South by 1861, go back several decades to the
development of slave-state cotton as the primary substance
for the looms of the United States, Great Britain and
the Continent.

Thie was principally achieved thro1J8h

the occurrence of two events at opposite ends of the
globe in the first half of the eighteenth century.

In

America, the invention and development of the cotton gin
resulted in the production and refinement of a brand of
co1;ton far superior and cheaper than any previously
used.3

In India, English investigations in the early

1840's revealed that the Indian soil could not grow the

type of outstanding cotton which flourished in the rich
southern soils of America.4

Thus, by 1845, there was al•

most a complete transfer of the British and Continental
cotton industries from the use of Indian and Egyptian
2~enator M. B. Hammond, "Speech on the Admission of
Kansas," March 4, 1858, United States Benate• Co8'ressional
Globe, 35th Congress (31 vols., Washington: 1858 ,

XXXVI, 961.
)Although Eli Whitney invented the cotton gin in 1793,
refinements brought more efficiency by 1861. The employment of slave labor for agricultural rather than industrial
purposes in the South was the natural result of the cotton
gin's improvements and potentialities.
40weley, ~Cotton, 5.
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cotton to American, or more specifically, southern cotton.

The result was near total reliance of the European cotton
inteTests on the supply of American cotton.

It was in Great Britain, though, wheI"e the nation's
largest industry depended so completely on a foreign
market, that the enormous and serious problems caused by
such an adverse economic situation were most clearly
demonstrated.

By 1860, "about one-fifth of the population

of England" -- or as the London Economist estimated,
"nearly four than th..r.ee milllons"5 -- depended, directly

or indirectly, upon the cotton industry for its livelihood. 6

Almost eighty per cent of the staple that main-

tained this huge activity came from the South.7
Thia economic situation created great consternation among many British politicians and economists who
anticipated a national calamity in the event of disruption
or loss of the American cotton crop.

In 1853, the London

Economist warned that "any great social or physical convulsion" in the United States would adversely affect all
of

~ngland.

The Economist cautioned that any distress in

5London Economist, January 19, 1861, in Owsley; ~
Cotton, 8-9.
6Thomas A. Bailey, A Di?lomatic Hiator~ of the American
People, {7th edition, Hew ork: 1964), 33 .-- ---

7~., 333.
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America would force the idleness of hundreds of ships,
the closure of thousands of mills, and the starvation of
millions of people. 8

''The destiny of the world hangs on

a thread," exclaimed the London Times; "never did so
much depend on a mere flock of down.n9
And so it seemed.

To the British economic and

political alarmists, perhaps unaware of the enormous
cotton surplus on hand in Britain in 1861, and unable
to f orsee the course of events of the impending American

Civil War, the Southern fiber was a national life-line.
To the bouthern leaders, the continuous arguments by the
English that Britain's very existence uepended upon
their cotton were exactly what they wanted to hear.
These portentous arguments, expressed in commercial journals, daily newspape1·s, and in the Houses of
Parliament and supported by statistics which proved
England received from three-fourths to five-sixths her
total cotton supply from

Am~rica,

produced a smug satis-

faction among the Southern planters.

Southerners were

proud that the export commerce of the slave states was
the richest in the world, that, in fact, for the fiscal
year ending on June 30, 1859, exports initiating in the
slave states were valued at

~naa.

6 million compared to

8London Economist, 1853, in Owsley, King Cotton, 11.
9London Times, June 1, 1861, in Owsley, King Cotton, 11.
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$5.3 million for the Northern free atatea.10

Southerners

were proud, too• that not only England but the- United
States and the h'uropean Continent, although on a much
lesser scale than Great Britain, demonstrated a comparable reliance on ~outhern cotton.11
But more important, Southerners were confident -due to the positive power of cotton -- to demand secession,
whether this be achieved peacefully through diplomatic
channels or combatively through civil war.

As this

confidence in the dominance of cotton continued to be
bolstered by current articles

an.Ci

political addressee

bot.h in England and the Sou.th, a growing concept concerning the allegiance of Great Britain to the South in case

of an outbreak of civil war in America became increasingly
popular. 1 2 Secessionist Southerners, as exemplified by
Hammond, believed that the commercial interests of Eu?ope
would ttema.nd a peaceful secession with no break in the
supply of cotton.

A powerful coalition of the forces

of Eu.rope would interfere to prove that "the world must
have the South's cotton a.t any price.nl3

lOJohn w. Du Bose, "Confederate Diplomacy," :.:>outhern
Historical oocietf .t'ale1's t R. A. Brook, 1'.;di tor, .X.XXII
(Ricnmond,

Virgin a:

954J, 105.

11 owsley, ~ Cotton, 14-15.

12James M. Callahan, ~i~lomatic History .Q! ~ Southern
Confederacy, (Baltimore, l 01), 79.

13charles H. Wesley,
(Washington, 1937), 109.

~

Collapse of !!!£..Confederacy

11

It seemed certain that since Great Britain in
particular was "the cotton factory of the worla,nl4 her
economic and commercial interests would require an unhampered flow of cotton from America to her ahores.
Otherwise she would intervene to restore and insure such
a flow.

The English satirical magazine, Puncht seemed

to phrase the British viewi
Though with the North we sympathize
It must not be forgotten
That with the South we've str9n.ger ties
Which are composed of cotton.!,Convinced that the commercial ?Owers of the
world "could not live with.out southern cotton, nl6 more
and .more oouthern statesmen came out arrogantly in defense of the slave states• trump card -- cotton.

Led

by David Christy, who first phrased the term "king
cotton,"17 Senator Alfred Iverson of Georgia, Major

w.

B.

Chase of Floriaa, J. D. B. De Bow, the editor of the
pro-Southern, pro-slavery

~ ~·~

Review, and Hammond,

the bouth indicated its obsession with the idea of cotton

140wa1ey, King Cotton, 10.
l5Punch, Na.rch )O, 1861, in B~.B. Sideman Md L. Friedman,
Bditors, h'Urope Looks l i !!!£Civil~ (New York, 1960),

:;6-37.
16
Owsley,

Ki!l£~

Cotton, 15.

17navid Christy, Cotton i,! Kings Or ~laver:t
.Qf Political Economy (Cincinnati, 18'5).

!!! lli Light
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power with a thorough repetition and amplification of
the boldest "king cotton" testimonia.ls.18
"The slave-holding South is now the controlling
power of the world," announced Hammond in the fall of
1860.19

A few months later Major Chase reported that any

attempted blockade of the Southern ports "would be

swept away" by a vigilant British fleet stationed near
the

~outhern

coasts to insure "the free flow of cotton

to English factoriea."20

Senator Iverson informed the

North in his departing speech from the Senate:

"Cotton

is king and will find some means to raise your blockade
and

disperse your ships." 21

With the merits

or

0

king

cotton" now proclaimed to the world, the Southern
political leaders retired to design an appropriate foreign policy which would utilize the strength of cotton
to the fullest.

18E. D. Adams, Great Britain and ~American Civil
War (2 vols., New '.fork: 1925), Il,Chapter 10 "King Cotton,"
H2; and Owsley, ~ Cotton, Chapter 1 "The Foundations
of Confederate Diplomacy, 11 1-50.
19
E. D. Adame, Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity,
66, in Adams, Britain ~ Civil ~' II, 2.
20Major w. B. Chase, ~Bow'~ Review, New ~eriea Vol. V,

No. 1 (January, 1861), 94-95.

21 senator Alfred Iverson, "Departing Speech to the
United States Senate," in Gallahan, Diplomatic history

Coni'ecieraci£:, 79.

.E.f.
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Meeting in Montgomery, Alacama, in early 1861,
the Confederate Provisional Congress and Cabinet officials faced the arduous task of devising an effective and
consietent foreign policy.

From the myriad diplomatic

plans and counter-plans which first circulated through
the congressional halls of Montgomery, there emerged by
February, 1861, two very definite, yet opposite,
policy proposals.

United only in their mutual dependence

on cotton, the two plans, presented respectively by
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman .Hobert B. Rhett and
by

:President Jefferson Davis, contrasted absolutely on

the tactical use of cotton and on the decision to award
either the United States or

~urope

precedence in any

initial Confederate diplomatic efforts.
Robert B. Rhett of South Carolina, twenty years
a member in the United States Congress, brought to the
Confederacy a life of experience in the study of revenue

and commercial laws.2 2

In the secession convention of

South Carolina, November 13 to December 24, 1860, he had
discussed a proposed treaty between the European commercial states and the imminent ~outhern Confederacy. 2 3 He
22Laura A. Wnite, "Hobert .Barnwell Rhett," in Dumas
Malone. hditor, ~ictionar~ of American Biogra~hy (22 vela.,
New York: 1933), XV, 526- 287
2 3John w. Du Bose, ~~and Times 2f. William Lowndes
Yancey (Birmingham, Alabama: 1892), 589.
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based this suggested treaty on the belief that if Great
Britain were offered favorable trade inducements, she
could be persuaded to recognize Confederate independenoe.24
Now in the formative months of the Confederacy, Rhett
developed a foreign policy based solely on economic
overtures to the commercial interests of

~land

and the

Continent.
The Bhett scheme was a three-point program to
secure recognition throUS<:h the establishment of both
offensive anu defensive treaties with the powers of
'
25 He advocated, primarily, a treaty of commer~urope.
cial alliance between the Confederacy and England and
France, for a duration of not less than twenty years and
dependent, of course, on their recognition of Southern
independence.

In addition, the South would impose an

import duty, no greater than twenty per cent,

~

valore.m,

on British and French goods; only a basic tonnage duty
would be levied, sufficient enough to maintain the Confederate harbors; and the European states would be permitted coasting rights, subject only to the police
2 4Edmund c. Burnett, Editor, "Dispatch from the
British Consul ut Charle~ton to Lord John Russell, 1860,"
American Historical Review, XVIII (July, 1913), 783-787.

w. ~atrick, Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana; i944), 77.
--- --25Rembert
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regulations of the Southern states themselves, Secondly,

the South would impose a discriminatory tariff of ten
per cent on all goods of all nations who refused to
accept the treaty.

Finally, Rhett advocated that the

Confederate diplomatic commissioners be empowered, after
the manner of Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deans, and Arthur
Lee during the Revolutionary War,

~o

form both military

and commercial alliances with the European powers and to
make guarantees to them concerning their North .American
possesaions. 26

Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs,
arguing that "ninety per cent of war was business,"
reiterated Rhett's demand for liberal powers to the Confederate ministers who could negotiate treaties based on
a reciprocity of benefits. 27 By no means was the suggestion by Rhett and Toombs for exceptional and compensatory
terms of a commercial treaty original..

Rather, the

Rhett proposal was a. "practical confronting of an
emergency" based on the proven success of the Revolutionary
War pacts.28

For Rhett and Toombs, then, any eoonomio

advantages the Confederacy l1eld through control of the

26nu Bose, Yanoey, 598-599.
oreign Policy of the Confederate
States," Confederate Veteran, XXVI (June, 1918), 246.
28Du Bose, ''Cfonfe<ierate Diplomacy, n 106.
27Flora Millard, "T'he

1

,ll
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cotton market could best be exerted through contracts of
a commercial nature based on the availability of the noble
fiber.
In summary, the Rhett-Toombs plan rested primarily on the practical use of tiouthern cotton through
trade alliances.

Rhett would readily make cotton avail-

able to the European commercial powers if they accepted
the basic Confederate condition to recognize officially
the

~outhern

Davis,

thi~

government.

Unlike the strategy of President

first plan offered immediate economic advan-

tages and guarantees.

It did not rely on future uncer-

tainties -- European desperation for cotton -- but on
present realities -- a mutually favorable trade agree-

ment.
In advocating also an immediate diplomatic
mission to Europe, before any preliminary negotiations
with the United States, Rhett and Toombs found an additional ally in the Confederate Vice President, Alexander
H. Stephens.

Although Stephens emphasized the retention

of cotton as a purely commercial power more so than the
quasi-political status which Rhett and Toombs would
give it, he nevertheless favored early negotiations
with Hurope in preference to the United Stated. 29
2 9callahan, D.iplomatic Hietory .Q.£ Confederacy, 86.

17
t>tephens, while quet:itioning tho full sincerity of Europe's
intentions towards the divided American Union, hesitated
to rely on European intervention even with Confederate
economic assurances. 30 Despite these reservations,
though, Stephens bolstered the Rhett-Toombs premise, which,
in turn, challenged the polic.Y of President Davis for
governmental sanction.31
Jefferson Davis, meanwhile, had followed with
great interest the debates and

discu~siona

among the

English political, financial and industrial leaders
concerning the contingent dependence of Britain upon
Southern cotton.
Cotton

!:!

~

Influenced still further by Christy's

and similar publications and arguments

on the American aide of the Atlantic, ''he became a
firm believer" in the power of cotton to procure European intervention on the side of the Confederacy in the
event of civil war with the North. 32

Convinced that the

30Henry Blumenthal, "Confederate Diplomucyi Popular
Notions and International Healities," Journal££ Southern
History, XXXII, No. 2 (1"1ay, 1966), 159.
31william L. Yancey, who later headed the first
Confederate mission to Europe, similarly supported the
arguments of the Rhett-Toombs forces. As we s~all see in
succeeding chapters, he accepted the responsibility of the
diplomatic mission with considerable reservations as to
the success it could generate without the liberal powers of
negotiation which Rhett sought.
32 0wsley, King Cotton, 15.
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mills of England would demand governmental action to insure and protect the cotton market from the South, Davia
proclaimed his "cotton famine" policy as the basis for
his administration's foreign relations.33
The "cotton famine" policy rested wholly on the
economic importance of the staple crop.

'v/1 thout

offering

any trade alliances, Davis fervently believed that commercial pressures would prostrate a suppliant Europe before "king cotton."

Thus, there was no need to propose

trade agreements contingent on Bu.ropean recognition of
the Gonfea.eracy.

To lla.vis and the

11

.king cotton" patrons,

such recognit.1.on must come -- and would come -- first
before thl cotton became available again to Europe,
contraut to tne Rhett-Toomb1.::>

sr.hAmP.,

In

the Davis plan ad-

vacates felt that cotton stored by the government on the
plantations, rather than offerea in international markets,
"was the best basis for ••• .Buropean aiplomacy. 1134
In audition to basing his diplomacy on the importance of the cotton crop, Davia further relied on the
legality of

sece~sion

itself.

He

contended that since the

American repubiic re8ted on the common consent of the
j3Millard, "Foreign tolicy of Confeaerate Btates, 11 242.
)4~'rederick ::> • .Daniel, Editor, The .Richmond Examiner
auring the War, .2£ .:£ill:. ~iri ti~s of John !1· Daniel (New
York, lB'bS")-;-February 26, 18 , 43'.
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governed, "it is the right of the people to alter or abolish" that government which in any way becomes "destructive
of the ends" for which it was established. 35

In compos-

ing the new Confederacy, the sovereign states were merely
insuring for themselves those rights which the present
Union had violated or curtailed.

As an independent en-

tity, the Confederate States were justly entitled to
"recognition as a member of the family of nationa. 11 3 6
Writing several years later, Davis revealed more
clearly this aspect of his diplomatic views.

In his

lengthy history of the Confeaeracy, the former President
indicated that a higher code of international morality
demu.nded rec ogni ti on for the Confederacy.

As

an indepen-

dent country, the Southern Union was entitled to such recognition -- the refusal of which Davis termed "unjust"
and a breach of "the performance of a duty" which "the
conscience of sovereigns" owed to the new etate.)7
Davis, too, found influential allies for his moralistic "cotton famine" policy.

In addition to the ardent

3 5confeaerate States of America, A Compilation of the
hessageu !!!'.!£?avers 2.f. ill.Confederacy, Incluaing tiie Dlplomutic Correspondence, ecu. ted b! Jame.a D. Richardson
~2 vols., Washington: 190J), I, 32.
36 lbid., 76.

-

37Jefferson Davis, 1'.!!! ~and Fal~ .Q.!. the Confeaerate
Government (2 vols., New York: 1881r;--.rr, 369-370.
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"king cotton" advocates already mentioned,3 8 the policy
gathered support from such Southern leaders as Judah P.
Benjamin, future Confederate Secretary of State, and IDdmund Rhett, a cousin of Robert Rhett of South Carolina,
who declared that because of England's need for cotton
"you British must recognize ue before the end of October
(1861)."39

~ecretary of the Treasury Christopher G. Mem-

minger similarly voiced "cotton famine" sympathies by
confidently supporting a complete halt of all cotton shipments to Europe until the anticipated pressure of the
famine would necessitate European intervention and recognition to again restore the cotton flow. 40

Memminger•s

idea of hastening the cotton fa.Illine in Europe through a
restrictive embargo on the valuable staple was by no means
his alone.

Throughout the first year of the war, the idea

was both a popular one and an enthusiastically pursued
one. 41
The Rhett and Davis plans clashed on the floors of
the

~rovisional

Congress meeting in Montgomery in the early

38see pages 11-12.
39s1r William H. Russell, M,l Diary North ~ South
(2 vols., New York: 1863), I, 70.
40Daniel, Richmond Examiner during ~ ~' 43.
4l0n the cotton embargo, discussed as it affected initial diplomatic missions to Europe by the Confecieracy,
see Chapter V below.
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weeks oi' February, 1861. 42

The commercial treaty re-

solution defended by Rhett and Toombs was presented to
the Congress for consideration with little change from
the original draft.

In fact, only a suggestion by John

Perkins of Louisiana which reduced the stipulation of the
trade alliance from twenty to six years was noteworthy.43
Despite the practicality and validity of their
argument, the 11.hett-Toomba forces could not realize the
support they needed for adoption of their resolution.
Pre;siuent Davis neither appreciGited nor accepted the
propositions of his
of

~he

~ecretary

of State and the Chairman

Committee on Foreign Helations.

Relying on a

policy which accented the economic importance of the
South to the world and on a platform which defended the
moral right of secession and consequently demanded recognition, Davis could not compromise with such an adverse

42The Journal of the ~rovisional Congress Qf ~ .Q..Q!!.federate :3tates .Q.f. Amerj.ca, unlike the Congressional
Globe, is extremely deficient in its treatment of Congressional debates. In the Journal we can only follow the
various resolutions concerning foreign affairs and reports
of the implementation of these resolutions. ~:iince there
was a notable difference of opinion between the HhettToombs faction and the Davis wing concerning the approach
to diplomatic relations, we must assume, therefore, that
differences were apparent in private sessions and committeE
meetings. t>ee proceeuings of the Provisional Congress in
Journal .Qf ~ Congress .Q.f the Confeaer~te btates of ~
ica (7 vols., Waf:>hington: l':N4-1905), I, 7-158.
43Du Bose, Yance;y, 600-601.
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plan as the others offered.
In reality, the Davis plan had already been put
into operation with the dispatch of three commissioners
to the United States before his final rejection of
Rhett's scheme.

:E1 or all practical purposes, he and his

fellow "king cotton" patrons had fully committed the
;:>outh to the "cotton famine" policy.

For better or for

worse, the Confeci.eracy and a distinctive Southern foreign policy had been joined together to win international
recognition and assistance.

Although Rhett continued as

Chairman of the Foreign Helations Committee, Toombs
shortly resigned his post as 0ecretary of State. 44

In

doing so, he fully acknowledged the inoperativeness to
which his department was relegated through the a.dministration' B acceptance of the "cotton famine" program.45

44For a further explunation of Toombs' resignment as
Gecretary of Gtate, see Chupter V, footnote No. l, below.
451,atrick, Davis ~ ~ Uabinet, 86.

CHAPTER II
THltEE DI}LaviATS IN SEARCH OF A MISSION
On February 25, 1861, as the first official dip-

lomatic act of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis authorized the appointment of three commissioners to the United
States. 1

This action, in direct opposition to the "Eur-

opean-first" suggestions of the abandoned Rhett-Toombs
plan, gambled that secession might be peaceably achieved
with little or no hindrance on the part of the Federal
goverrunent.

Davis, in an attempt to demonstrate "that a

civilized and moderate administration had assumed the reins
of' the Confederate government, 112 pressed on Washington the

demand for recognition, which, he contended, the legality

-Of secession ordered.
In his controversial history, The Rise and Fall
of the Confederate Government, Davia indicated that the
moral righteousness of secession would necessitate Union
capitulation and eventual European recognition.3

lRichardson, f11essages
2 .

™ Papers

He

of Confederacy, I, 55.

Blumenthal, "Confederate Diplomacy," 156.

3see footnote No. 37, Chapter I, for a complete citation of Davis' Rise and. !!'all, and a further explanation of
the views whichhe"v'OICed in it.
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qualified this statement with examples of the stability
and strength of unification which the Confederacy had
exhibited to him throughout the four years of the war.
However, in February, 1861, there was no independent
Southern experience to cite.

.ttatner, the entire argument

for secession which the "first envoys of the cotton
kingdom 11 4 presented was this idealistic conception that
secession was not only legally, but also morally, justified.

.Rhett, Toombs,

~tephens,

Yancey and others warned

that a commission to the United States based solely on
the Davis premise could not possibly succeed.

Yet,

rejecting the practical warnings of his political adversaries, Davis directed Confederate diplomacy along a
path which they regarded inept.
Martin J. Crawford, John Forsythe and A. B.
Roman arrived in Washington on March 5, 1861, the day
after the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln.

On

"princi-

ples of right, justice, equity, and good faith, 11 5 they

petitioned both the President and his Secretary of State,
William Henry Seward, for interviews.

"With a view to a

4owsley, King Cotton, 51.
5 11 A Resolution for the Appointment of Commissioners
to the Government of the United States of America,"
.February 15, 1861, in Richardson, Messages and Papers Qf.
Confederacy, I, 55.
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speedy adjustment of all questions growing out of •••
(the) political separation, 11 6 the commissioners anxiously
awaited a reply.

On March 15, Secretary Seward, through a State
Department memorandum, "respectfully declined" to enter
into any negotiations with the Confederate commissioners.
He acknowledged to the Southern delegation that he was
fully aware of the "events ••• and. conditions of political affairs 0 which cu.rrently existed .between the states
of the Union.

However, Seward viewed the Southern coali-

tion of states not as a result of a "r.ightful and accomplished revolution and (hence) an independent nation,"
but as ".a perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement'' which he confidently expected soon would be brought
to an end •. To Forsythe, Crawford and Roman, the Secretary
of State admitted "that he has no authority" to recognize
their credentials as diplomatic agents from a non-existent
and extra-legal foreign state. 7
For nearly a month the three Southern representatives remained in Washington.

Although they never met

6"Letter of John Forsythe and Martin J. Crawford to
William H. Seward, March 15, 1861," in Dunbar Rowland,
Jefferson Davis,· Constitutionalist: ~ Lette1·s, Papers
!:!!!£.Speeches (10 vols., Jackson, Mias.: 1923), V, 86.
?"Department of tltate N.emorandum, March 15, 1861," in
Rowland, Jefferson lJavis: Constitutionalist, V, 87-91.
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with Seward, -chey continued to send him notes in wh;i.ch
they reiterated the familiar demands and principles for
recognition.

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,

Jo.hn A. Campbell. who later served as the Conf'ederate
assistant secretary of war, relayed many of these messages
to Seward while serving in an unofficial capacity as an
intermediary between the two forcea.8

Nevertheless,

the Federal position remained as firm and determined to
resist the Southern overtures as the Confederacy was to
attain her independence.

With the outbreak of hostilities

at Fort Sumter on the morning of April 12, all preliminary
negotiations with the United States ceased and the Confederate commissioners withdrew from their Washington
posts.
While the abortive mission to the United States
was still in progress, Davis and his foreign policy
advisors realized that the Confederate request for recognition ana independence would not immediately be forthcoming from the Union.

The Crawford-Forsythe-Roman mission,

sentenced to failure through inadequacies of both purpose
and method, futilely remained in Washington despite their
initial rejection.

The senselessness of any prolonged

8walter Chandler, "Diplomatic History of the Southern
Confederacy," Confederate Veteran, XXX (December, 1922),
241-242.
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stay by these commisaioners in the North's capital, so
aptly demonstrated by the inability of the mission to
even meet with Seward, much less win recognition, demanded
that the Confederacy redirect its diplomacy to seek from
the states of hurope that recognition and support which
the northern states of America firmly and unequivocally
withheld.
In accoraance with the nomination of Davis, on
March 16, 1861, Confederate becretary of ctate Robert
M. T. Toombs appointed the initial Southern diplomatic
mission to the major states of Europe.9

To William L.

Yancey of Alabama, Ambrose Dudley Mann of Virginia, and
Pierre A. Rost of Louisiana, he entrusted the Confederate
hopes for immediate European recognition and assistance.

9.Pickett .lJa.pers, Toombs to Yancey, Rost and Mann,
March 16, 1861. The principal primary source used in the
research for this paper wa~ the Official Records of the
Diplomatic Correspondence of the Confederate States of
America. These papers, located in the Manuscript Division
of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., consist of
a number of portfolios which catalogue, according to
country, the various correspondence of the Southern diplomatic agents. .The bulk of this collection, and the sections witn which this study is particularly concerned,
are the Pickett Papers. These papers contain most of the
diplomatic correspondence of the European commissioners,
and until additional manuscripts were added to the collection, served as the official source for all Confederate
foreign relations records. 8ince the Pjckett l>apers were
used extensively in the reeearcn for this paper, they shall
be referred to specifically rather than to the entire
Official Records collection in future citations.
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Born in 1814, William Lowndes Yancey, the youngest

of the three appointees, wal:l certainly the best known
member of the com.mission.

'r.hrough his years in the Ala-

bama ana United States Congresses, Yancey gradually and
totally changed from a unionist Congressional sympathizer
to a staunch states rights orator. 10 By the time of the
Democratic presidential convention in Charleston, South
Carolina, during the winter and spring of 1860, Yancey
took the lead in open avowance of the right of secession
and the concept of Southern solidarity.

Demanding

Federal protection to slavery in the territories, Yancey
ardently called for the secession of Southern members
from the convention ii' their terms were denied. 11 He
assumed the reins of secet:3sionist leadership in this
convention and became t.ne chief manager for the movement
in the months ahead.
As an eloquent and influential speaker, a man
who "had no equal in the South, 0 12 Yancey could hardly be

dismissed from consideration as one of the leaders who

lOA. L. Venable, "William L. Yancey's Transition from
Unionism to States' Rights," Journal£! SoutHern ·History,
X (August, 1944), 331-388.
11Anthony W. Dillard, "William L. Yancey: The Sincere
and Unfaltering Advocate of ~outhern Rights," M.on1;gomery
Daily Advertiser (April 15, 1893), in ~outhern Historical
~ociety Papers, XXI (1893), 154-156.
12

~., 155.
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woulu direct the new Confederacy.

Yet his "unguarded

eloquence and chronic dissatisfaction with the existing
regime"l3 made Yancey as much a threat to the new order
of government as an aid.

He consistently urged the re-

opening of the slave trade, and although the Confederate
government shared his states rights and pro-slavery sentiments, the militancy of his arguments prevented any full
endorsement of acceptance of them.
Like Hhett and Toombs, Yancey expected nothing of
consequence from the mission to Washington which could
justify the delay in establishing diplomatic relations
with the commercial powers of EuroDe.14

In aadition, he

firmly believed that any commissioners to Europe should
be empowered to negotiate commercial treaties.

Yet in

defining very narrowly the direction and scope of Confederate diplomacy, Yancey at first neither expected nor
desired appointment to the mission.
Just why Yancey, an aspirant to the presidency

of tbe Confederate Btates, accepted the mission to E'urope
is a minor mystery.

The fact that he accepted the commis-

sion without the instructions or powers which he admittedly
esteemed essential to the success of the delegation only

13Bur~on J. Hendrick, Statesmen

York, 1939), 141.
l4Du Bose, Yancey, 5~6.

Qf ~~Gause (New
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deepens the mystery.

His biographer, John Witherspoon

Du Bose, oomments inadequately on this problem.

To

Du Bose, Yancey consented to the mission "with characteristic valor" out of mere patriotism to the Confederate
cause. 1 5

Du Bose further announces that his overpower-

ing personal zeal to defend to the utmost the principle
of secession moved Yancey to consent "to his own sacrifice. "16
It seems Du Bose has entered an explanation based
on convenience rather than actuality.

Granted, Yancey

was an influential Southern personality, but he was an
individual who did nothing "that placed him above the average patriot of the day. 111 7

More than one historian has

concluded that Yancey's radicalism -- radical even
beyond the slavocracy outcries of the Southern gentry
could not be tolerated in the high places of Confederate
government. 18 In eulogizing slavery and advocating a

15nu Bose, "William L. Yancey in History," Richmond Times,
October 31, 1899; also, Du Bose, Yancey, Chapter XXV, ''Confederate Diplomacy," 572-627.
16 Du Bose, "Yancey in history."
l7p. L. Rainwater, "Notes on ~outhern :Personalities:
William L. Yancey," Journal Qi. Southern History, IV (19j8),
220.
18

rn addition to Rainwater, Anthony Dillard (see
footnote .No. 11) and Burton Hendrick tsee footnote No. 13)
voiced similar skepticism as to the super-patriotism of
Yancey. Frank Owsley and B. D. Adams further joined
these historians in substan~iating Yancey's undesirability in the ~outh on account of his radical sentiments.
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complete destruction of the Union and the Cont:1titution,
Yancey was a Southern extremist of the first rank.

He not

only suggested a re-opening of the African slave trade,
but also insisted that enough black men should be imported "to provide every Southerner, rich and poor,
city dweller to hillbilly, with at least one slave." 19
Such drastic proposals, though approved by the minority
Bouthern fire-eaters, did not fit the image of democratic
righteousness which the Confederacy attempted to project.
The mission to Europe offered Yancey's political opponents an ideal opportunity to rid the South of hie
•

dangerous oratory.
Yancey, too, thwarted in his presidential aspirations, must surely have realized the senselessness to remain in the South with any hopes of regaining nia presecession influence.

Although he outwardly voiced re-

luctance against the mission, his acute understanding of
the internal political situation of the South must surely
have overridden his objections to the mechanics of the
commission.

Thus, as tht: head of a diplomatic corps

which based its arguments on the debatable

impor~ance

of

the cotton crop. Yancey found it expedi.ent to compromise
personal conviction with political reality.

19Hendrick,

~tatesmen

2.£

~Cause,

140.

When Rhett
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heard that Yancey's diplomacy would be based on the justice of the cause and cotton, he warned the commissioner·:
"Sir, you have no business in Europe. 1120
business in the Confederate

~tates

But with no

either, Yancey grudg-

ingly accepted the responsibility of the mission -- a
mission which dubiously extolled his patriotism, but
which definitely demonstrated his pragmatism.
Ambrose Dudley Mann, a native of Virginia, was
the only experienced diplomat among the trio.

For

several years he served inconspicuously as a minister to
the German states while stationed at Bremen.

He nego-

tiated some minor commercial treaties with Hungary (1849)
and Switzerland (1850) before being recalled to the
United States.

His final position in service to the

Federal government wus as Assistant Secretary of State
to William L. Marcy from 1853-1856. 21
Adept in trade and commercial matters, Mann
drew popular Southern attention to himself, when, in 1858,
he advocated the adoption of a direct ~team.ship line from
Southern ports to Europe. 22 His pro-Southern and states
rights

B~ntiment~

drew endorsement from Yanoey, Hammond,

20nu Bose, Yancey, 600.

21 Gullahan, Diplomatic history £!. Confederacy, 85.
22 0wsley, "Ambrose Dudley Nann, 11 in Malone, Dictionary
of American Biography, VI, 23':1-240.
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De Bow and others. 2 3

By the time of the secessionist

movement, his suggestions to eliminate Southern vassalage to Northern industry and commerce had already been
translated into action and Nann was a logical Confederate
foreign diplomat.
But experience,
~outhern

~habby

though it was, and pro-

sympat!.ies do not necessarily make a diplomat.

Mann clearly demonstrated this.

Robert Bunch, British

Consul at Charleston, sarcastically reported that Mann,
"the son of a bankrupt grocer,"held a reputation
which was "not good. 1124 Yet, his reputation was only
suspect by the very fact that it was based UJJon an
indifferent career and a flamboyant personality.
There doesn't see1;, to be any grounds for a
popular movement to ria. the Confeaeracy of Mann as there
was with Yancey.

Logic ally, llis record as a foreign

service representative indicated some basis for his
appointment.

A:::> an inaividuai., 0wsley charact.erizes

him as u man who "seemea to have stepped out of the
pages of a book. 112 5

]'ull of bombastic phraseB and

sophomoric sentiments, l'·iann was a diplomatic Polonius,
23owsley, "Ambrose Dudley l"lann," in Malone, Dictionary
of American Biography, VI, 239-240.
24Adams, Britain~ Civil fil, I, 63.
~)5

Owsley,

Kint~

Cotton, ?2.

34

capable of doing his government harm in every situation.
His credulity and lack of perspective tinged all of
his diplomatic correspondence.

Yet aside from these

glaring inadequacies, Mann possessed a certain social

charm which enabled him to penetrate inner circles a.nd
to establish contacts among influential people. 26
The South could not have chosen a more inadequate candidate to complete the commission than the
t.nird appointee, Pierre A. Rost. 2 7
Rost moved to Louisiana in 1816.

Born in .Prance,
He served briefly in

the Mississippi legislatur·e in 1826.

At the time of

hin diplomatic appointment, he held a judgeship in the
::>upreme Court of' Louisiana.28

Relatively obscure

throughout the South, and with no previous diplomatic
experience, Rost seems to owe his commission to his contacts
with Judah ?. Benjamin, later Confederate i:iecretary of
27rn criticizing the appointments of Yancey, Rost
and Mann, the author does not intend so much as to suggest
better candidates, as he does to indicate the poor selectivity of these three men in particular. Later diplomatic assignments of' the Confederacy -- James Iv'iason to
1ngland, John clidell to France, Colonel John ~ickett
to Mexico, a.nu Henry Hotze as commercial agent to
Europe -- indicated that the ~outh did have available
competent individuals who could satisfactorily asaume a
foreign service position. But in appointing these more
qualified men after tne initial diplomatic failures, the
Confederacy unwittingly operated in Oana-like fashion
from which nothing short of a miracle could have achieved
succeus.
28

Callahan, Diplomatic History £[ Confederacy, 85.
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Secretary of State, and

Pre~ident

Davis.

As a native-born Frenchman, Rost purported to
have a thorough knowledge of the foreign language, and
this, no doubt, contributed to his otherwise negligible
diplomatic skills.

Yet, his knowledge of French seems to

have been just as negligible.

Paul Du Ballet, a displaced

ooutherner who remained in Paris .throughout t.he war, reported that Rost 's broken Ji'rench was a source of constant
ridicule and embarrassment to him.

Questioning the

decision of Davis to send such a dubious character on
such an important mission, Du Bellet asked:

"Has the

~outh no sons capable of representing our country?" 2 9

It is not too difficult to echo Du Bellet's
query and to expand it to include the entire commission.
Although they we.re not, as Owsley describes, "the
poorest choices possible, 11 30 they were far from the
best.

All three were extreme pro-slavery advocates and

eager secessionists.

To send such men to the major

European capitals flaunted the Old World's anti-slavery
sentimentality.

Moreover. the selection of Rost, a

nouveau riche expatriate, "rather offended than pleased
2 91-'aul Du Bellet, "The ])iplomacy of tne Confederate

Cabinet," 13-16. A typed copy of this criticism of
Southern diplomacy and aiplomats is contained in the
Pickett .t>apers.
30 0wsley, Ki~ Cotton, 51.
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~1 rench officials." 3l

Yet into the hands of these three

inappropriate selections the Confederate State Department entrusted a policy equally unrealistic and inconsistent with the demands of international politics.

In the same communication in which the appointment was made, Toombs outlined the State Department's
instructions to the ministers.32

For the most pa.rt, these

instructions reflected the policy and approach which
Davis ordered.

These same instructions, inadequate as

they were inflexible, continued as the main Confederate
pol.icy for the; duration of the war.33

Because of their

persistent use, and despite their negligible success,
it is necessary now to evaluate and understand them.
Toombs outlined very specifically the direction
and argument for the Confederate mission.

i'he commissioners

31Hendrick, Statesmen .Q! ~ Cause, 140.
32 Pickett Papers, Toombs to Yancey, Rost and Mann,
March 16, 1861. The following paragraphs, pages 36
to 40
are baseci on the ins true tions of Toombs to the
commissioners.
33The major deviation from the direction of Confederate
diplomacy a.a initiated by the ~ancey-Rost-Mann mission occurred in the closing months of the war with the establishment of the Kenner Mission. Offered in March, 1865, the
Kenner plan was a direct proposal on the part of the
Confederate State Department to abolish slavery in return
for Jmg~is.h acknowledgment of the ~out.h's independence.
The plan had been designed by Judah l?. Benjamin and indicated
by its proposed terms the la:..>t futility and desperation of
the Confederate position.
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were instructed to visit Greut Britain, France, Ruseia
and Belgium ana to announce to these countries that the
Confederate States had "severed their connections with
the United States" and had formed an independent government, "endowad with every attribute of sovereignty and
powers necessary to entitle them to assume a place among
the nations of the world."

Af'ter listing several of their

grievances against the United States which prompted the
Confederate action,34 Toombs ordered the ministers to
ask for the admission of the Confederacy into the
"family of independent nations" and to obtain "that
acknowledgment and friendly recognition which are due to
every people capable of self-government and ••• the
power to maintain their independence."

Toombs further

cited that Davis and the Southern citizenry confidently
expected "the enlightened Government of Great Britain"
to quickly accept Confederate independence and extend
diplomatic recogni.tion.
After -- and only after -- the attainment of recognition, Yanc.:ey, Rost and .Mann were further instructed to
34Toombs contended that sinue 1828, the indu~trial
Northern stateo hc.td compelledthe 8outh to "pay bounties"
to them through the imposition of' a high protective tariff.
Through this annual "extortion, 11 the Secretary claimed
that serious attempts were m&de to overthrow the proaperi ty, social ~Yb~em, and self-rule of the Southern states.
He stressed that these grievances were not immediate or
hastily construed ones, but had been bui.l t up for decades.
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negotiate treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation
with England.

It is important to stress this aspect of

their instructions.

Nowhere were the commissioners em-

powered to negotiate treaties of any nature unless the
requirement of formal recognition had been obtained.
Thus, the edge of Confederate initiative was completely
removed.

These instructions placed the fate of the

mission solely in the

d~plomatic

decisions of Great

Britain rather than on the diplomatic efforts of the
Confederate agents.
In keeping with the principles of a policy baaed

predominantly on the potential coercive power of cotton.
Toombs ordered the commissioners to convince England of
the advantages of an alliance with the cotton capital.
He advised the diplomats to remind Great Britain of her
dependency on "king cotton" and of "the condition to
which the British realm would be reduced" if the cotton
supply should suddenly diminish or cease.35

In addition,

tne Secretary of St1:1.te announced, with one major reservation, th<:Lt all existing treaties between the United
States and England would continue in effect with the

35As sriown below, this instruction by Toombs to constantly remind the british of their precarious economic
situation grauually antagonized the British statesmen.
If' the English economic system was in jeopardy, Englishmen
hardly needed, or endured, consistent reminders to this
effect from the Southern diplomats.
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government of the Confederate States.
The single exception was the Webster-Aahburton
Treaty, which, in addition to settling the northeastern
boundary between Maine and New Brunswick, provided for
a United States naval force off the coast of Africa to
suppress the African slave trade.

Toombs reported, that

although Confederacy already "prohibited the slave
trade" and intended "in good faith to prevent it" in
the South, his government could. not comply with this
obligation.

Toombs failed to elaborate the Confederate

position of non-compliance with the Webster-Ashburton
Treiaty; but, then again, how does one exp_lain moral
propriety on the one hand with social injustice on the
other?
Besides the standard passports and letters of
introduction to the foreign affairs ministers of the
various target nations, the commissioners carried with
them a complete set of the laws of the United States, a
copy of

Wheaton'~

month salary.

International

~'

and a $1,000.00 a

Any additional expenses

papers, entertainment fees, stationery
by the diplomats themselves.

postage, newsmust be absorbed

Since a secondary function

of the mission was to report on

~!the

policy and views of

the Government" to which the ministers were assigned, the
failure by the Confederate State Department to grant the
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commissioners compensation f'or their r€gular correspondent
efforts demonstrated both an incompetent allotment of
funds anci confidence in a speedy diplomatic success.
With no creditable diplomatic experience behind
them, with no expense account to subsidize them, and with
no realistic policies to guide them, Yancey, Host and
Mann departed for }.;urope.

Tiley carried with them the

hopes and expectations of a secessionist coalition of
Southern states.

They would shortly find that the

"enlightened" European states, which Toombs alluded
to, dealt not in popular emotionalism but rather in
political opportunism.

CHAPTER III
A E.1JROPEAN DEBUT :B1 0R SOUTHERN DIPLOMA.CY

Having received their instructions and credentials, the three commissioners immediately set out for

Europe.

Yancey and Rost, traveling together, arrived

in London on April 29.l

Mann, who had ta.ken a different

route by way of Washington, reached England on May 15.2
The Confederates were greeted in London by Williaru H.
Gregory, a Conservative-Liberal active member of Parliament and one of the most ardent

cham~ions

of the South,

who, with a host of other prominent Englishmen, comprised
the influential bouthern lobby.3
This pro-Con:federate lobby of native English
propagandists contributed valuable assistance to the
Southern dip1omats throughout the entire war effort.
Through their influence on the Liberal govei·nm.ent and in

lp1ckett Papers, Diopatch No. 1, Yancey, Rost and Mann
to Toombs, Hay 21, 1861.

2For a full account of Mann's trip from the South to
Great Britain, see: J. l'. Moore, "Lincoln and the Escape
of the Confederate Commissioner Ambrose .Dudley Mann,"
Illinois State Historical Society Journal, LVII (Spring,

1964), 23-29.

3Aaams, Britain fil1£ the Civil War, I, 90-91.

42

Parliament, through their efforts to mobilize public
opinion for the Confederacy, and through their persuasiveness in private industry, the lobbyists assured
the Confederacy that segments of the British population
vciced pro-::iouthern sympathies.

More often than not,

Yancey, Host and Mann, by associating almost exclusively
with the British aristocracy that comprised the lobby,
tended to exaggerate the lobbyists' overly optimistic
reports.

As a result of such misleading and tainted

information from their

.British contacts, the commissioners

often relayed delusive information to the Confederate
capital.

It is the duty of a valuable diplomat, though,
to sift and evaluate the information he receives and to
draw objective conclusions from it.

Through the re-

strictive nature of their contacts and the tendency of
the t;outhern ministers to grasp any loose straws of
encouragement, this first mission to .t:;urope established
defective precedents.

This poor reportorial ability

of the Southern diplomats, begun with Yancey, Rost, and
Viann, continued to plague and mislead the Confederate
government throughout the war years.

Yet the blame for

these operational failures of the mission rests as much
with the commissioners t.hem:::;elves as it does with the
Confederate

~itate

Department which accredited such in-

experienced and emotionully-guided individuals.
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In addition to Gregory, James I•I. Spence, William
S. Lind.say, Alexander J. Beresford-Hope, Lor·d Robert
l'•Iontague and others contributed their time and efforts
to the ~outhern cause. 4

Although they expounded the

virtues of the Sout.t1, an iaealistic belief in the
righteousness of the Confederate fight for independ.ence
was not t.he sole motive of these British sympathizers.
Many, like Lindsay and the Laird brothers, prominent
English ship-builders, were certainly affected as much
by economic opportunity through cotton speculation and
trade advantages as by an idealistic temperament.
Others, like Eustace and Robert Cecil, cieymour Fitzgerald
and Lord Campbell, saw in the American Civil War the
chance

to evince long pent-up hostilities against the

United btates.5

In any event, the prospect of a vast

free trade market in the Confederacy,. the dissol vement
4owsley, ~ Cotton, 62. In addition to the several
lobbyists who axe listed throughout the body of the paper,
other influential bnglishmen who contributed substantially
to the Confederate cause were; Justice Haliburton, Bir.
E. C. Kerrison, J. T. Hopwoou, G. M. W. Peacocke, w.
Vansi ttart, W. E. Duncombe, :::ii1· James Fergussen and James
~1iteside, all Cone~rvatives; and Frederick Feel, ~ecre
tary to the Treasury. In the ilouoe of Lords, Lord Wharncliffe, a great mine-owner, the Earl of Donoughmore, and
the Narquess of Lothian were the most ardent men who compr:i sed the Confederate lobby, see: Donaldson JorO.an and
Edwin J. Pratt, Europe and the .American Civil War (New York,

1931), 89-91.

.

~ ~

5owsley, King Cotton, 62, 172.

44
of the high tariffs of the Union, and the potential
benefit to British manufacturers and shippers from the
de.feat of their Northern competitoi·s induced the upper
class couunercial powers of Britain to favor the Soutp.

Until the arrival of Henry Hotze, a prominent
~outhern

newspaperman who assumed the direction of the

Confederate propaganda program in Europe in November,

1861, 6 the douthern lobbyists delivered their appeals
for Confederate support through letters to the leading
English newspape.rs, speeches, ancl a. limitea num:oer of

topical books and pami)hlets. 7

Hotze, shortly after his

arrival in Great Britain, established
pro-~>outhern

~

Index, the

paper which became the official mouth-

piece of the Confederate lobby.

But more important

for the moment than these nationwide appeals to the
6

Jordan,

~'urope ~American Civil~'

166-167.

7'1 he most effective propaganda work by a member of the
Southern lobby was ::Jpence'.s American Union. In this book,
~pence outlin8d the b~sic aifferences between the North
and the bouth and. argued convincingly .for the l:lovereignty
of the American ;:;tat8l:l an<1 tht·ir constitutional right to
secede. .England' the l~ortn
ill. tiouth by .BeretifordHope c.nu A Hirror in America b.y Lord Montague both contained
bitter attac:Ks on tne North and voiced arguments for the
recognition of t>outaern independence. In addition to these
monogra1JhS, ::;everal pamphlets, among them ~ American
~u~etion in §:. Nutshell by Hugo Reid and Englan<i and ~
Dit:Jrupted. 0t~te~.; of America by Tnomas C. Grattan, similarly
voiced pro-oouthern ::3entimtJn1.t:. Jfor a mor'e thorough
lit'3'ting of the propaganua wri tirit:;s by the Southern lobby
in .r~ngland, uee ~ Owsley, King Cotton, "The Na.ti ve
l'ropagandists," 171-17'3.
1

rn
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people was the work of the lobbyists to assure

debate on the America:: crisis in .Parlia::ent am.i to

~;u(1tu·c

for the Confederate commissioners interviews with
Lord John Russell, the British ]'oreign ::>ecretary.

On

l'•lay 3, 1861, principally through the efforts of Gregory,

the f'ir::;t vital meeting between the tiouthern delegation
and Russell took place.

The tnitial conference with .Russell was a strictly
informal affair at which the Confederate ministers
neither presented their credentials nor officially
stated their purpose, but merely participated in "an
informal interchange of views upon American affairs.~ 8
H.ussell informed the envoys that "it would give him
pleasure" to hear exactly what they had to comrnunicate,

yet "under present circuro.stci.nces," he would have little
to say.9

Under these discouraging terms, YWtcey and

Rost proceeded to elaborate the Confederate position as
outlined in their instructions.
8 r1ckett J:lapers, Dispatcn No. 1, Yancey, Rost and Nann
to Toombs, May 21, 1861. Uome diplomatic correspondence
in the Pickett Papers, Library of Congre~s, has been published in Volume 3, i.:>eriel> 11 of the ttij_rty-one volu..11e
Officinl Hecords of the Union and Confederate Navies in
the War of the rte belllon (Washington, D. C.: 1922). ThiB
series, however, hus appe:_i.red in only one printing and
was initiully selective of the materials in the Fickett
Papera. Primary reliance he1ein is upon the original
manuscript collection. The Official Hecords are useful
for supJJlemcntary guiciance and comparative purposes.
9

lEl!!·
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The commissioners stressed the legality of
secession in their presentation to Russell.
particular

e~phasis

They placed

on the democratic principles of self-

government which demanded and directed the formation of
the Uonfederute ;;>tates.

In ccnclusion, the Southern agents

noted "the ability of the Confederacy to defend their
position" and the elemen'ts of IJermanency and the potentia1ities of cornmercial success imbued in the
peo~le.

Uouthern

In all this the Uonfeaerates reported thut

iiussell "manifested rnuch inteI·est. n

He concluded the

interview with an indication that the matter of Southern
recognition would soon be brought up for Cabinet consultdtion.10
All in all, it was an unobtrusive effort to stress
the constitutional lights which had Brompted secession and
to suggest the service to world peace and the benefits
to English economy which an immediate recognition of
the Confederate Lltates would hChieve.

Alt.i10ugh the

dispatch of Yancey, host, and Hann to the State Depart-

ment concerning the interview inuicc.1.ted that the atmosphere was c ontsenial and the 0ecretary wa:J amicable, the
whole tone of the letter reflected an optilliism w11ich !lad

10..t'ickett .h.ip1:.:.rs, Di spa ten No. 1, Yuncey, lmut and
Nann to 'l\001u.us, Nay 21, H3bl.
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U.tt1e basiu.

The general result of the confrontation

was that Russell listened, but definitely refused to

himself to any guarantees of recognition,

commit

The

commission was forced, not by consent but by the inadequacies of their instructions, to play a waiting game

the British.

with

Thus the Confederate policy limita-

tions aguirwt any initiatives by the ministers -limitations wrlich H.hett, Toombs anu Yancey warned against
wonths earlier -- appeared in the early operations of the
mission.

Alt.hough the minis ter·s implied that they were

content to wait on British action, in rE:ality they had
no

other choice.

During the first weeks of the Confederate delegation's stay in England, "British foreign policy wa:;;
rapidly matured and announced, 11 11

Basically, Hussell

proposed a recognition of the belligerency of the Confederate States to be proclaimed in a joint resolution
with France.

Working for the most part without the

interference and to a large extent without the knowledge of the Southern

repreHent~tives,

the British Foreign

Oli'ice announced the Neutrality Proclamation on .May 13, 1861.

11Adams, Brituin ~the Civil~' I, 87.
12

Owsley,

Kin{~

Gatton, 5d.

12
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The British position indicated primarily the
desire on the part of the English commercial
to avoid a maritime war.

in~erests

By recognizing Confederate

belligerency, England assured a continuation of her
commerce with the Southern states by granting to the
Confederate merchant marine the same 1;rivileges in
neutral ports which the J!,ederal ships enjoyed.13

Though

ha1dly recognizing Confederate independence, the Neutral-

ity iroclamation temporarily elevated the statuo of the
Confederacy to a plane comparable in international law
to that of the United btat0s.

The united british and

French stand inaici:itt;d q_ui Le une4_ui vocally, though, that
any recognition of independence would. be dictated by
future events.

Neverthele::;s, a proclamation in favor of

Confederate belligerency seemed to be a definite step in
the progression to formal recognition in the minus of the
Llouthernenvoys.

It is again irni.iortant to note, however,

t.hL;.t the British decision occurred through no influence
by Yancey, Rost and lvi.ann, w.notie presene e in England must

alreaciy have seemed

t>omewha~

ouperfluous.

As British policy developed in the first two
weeks of l"iay, 1861, i:;he Confeo.erate commissioners pressed

lJNorman A. Graebner, ".Northern Diplomacy and European i'~~utrali ty," in llavia. Donald, .Editor, Why the North
1/on tlie Civil War (Buton lwuge, Louit:d.ana.: 1':;160),56.
1

49
On May 9, the ministers

Russell for a second interview.
met with the Foreign decretary.14

Little did they

realize that already the operations of Union counterdiplomacy were at work which would make this second
interview witn Russell the last personal encounter
between the Yancey-Rost-Mann mission and the British
.h"'oreign Of fie e.
The primary reuson for this second meeting was
to relay to Hussell
h~d

informa~ion

which the Southerners

recently received in two dispatches from Toombs.

A short letter, dated April 2, informed the commissione:rb
that the Confederate constitution hari been ratified by

aeven states and vut into effect.15

Three weeks later,

however, they received Diupo.tch No. 2 from Toombs which
announced the beginning of hostilities between the North
and the South and wl1ich contained supplementary instruc-

tions for the ministers.16

The 8ecretury of State relayed

details of the taking of lfort Sumter and of the consequences of that event, which i_ncluded 1j.ncoln's proclamation of a state oi' insur.rection and the mobilization of

1411 ickett :h1pers, Dispatch No. 2, Yancey, host and .Nann
to Toombs, June 1, 1861.

15rickett L'apers, lJispa. tch .ifo. 1, Toombs to Yancey,
Ro;;;,t and Mann, April 4, 1861.
161 ickett i:apers, Di~putch No. 2, Toombs to Yancey,
.rioBt and Hann, April 24, 1861.
1
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Union troops.

Toombs instructed the ministers "to

assure all powers 11 that tne Confedei·acy would ta.ke all
precautions in the ensuing conflict to insure the rights
of commerce to all neut1al powers.

Since Toombs' dis-

patch contained glowing reportu of new states -Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee,
and IV!iusouri -- which "manifested

a

Arkansa~,

determination" to resist

the "unprovoked policy of aggression" of the government
of Washington, it hardly comE::s as a surprise that he
ordered the diplomats to read the entire dispatch to the
ministers of foreign affairs to which they were accredited.
To the information in Toombs' letter the commissioners reported that Russell "manifested considerable
interest."

The Foreign 8ecretury assured. Yancey and Rost

that the British government was anxious to communicate
with the govt:.rnments of ·11ashington and Montgomery over
the matters of the blockade, neutral rights and the shipments of neutral goods in enemies' ships.

Yet, as before,

H.ussell declined to offer any guarantees concerning the
recognition of Confederate independence.

He merely re-

i ten.;.. ted his earlier statementt:> that the matter or recogni-

tion would be considered by the British Cabinet, and that

no pledges, one way or the other, could presently be given.17

171 ickett l'upers, Dispatch No. 2, Y~tncey, Rost and
f'iann to Toombs, June 1, 1861.
1

51
Russell's position prompted the commissioners
to report "t.tiat the British Cabinet here have no settled
policy as to the recognition of our Government. 0 18
the Confederate observed,

~ngland

l.iather,

will continue to

postpone a decision of l"ecogni tion until "some decided
aci.vantage" is gained by the Confec.erate St.(;;.tee, or until
"the nccH>Si ty for hu.ving cotton becomes pre:.;sing. 11 19
They concluded that despite governmental inaction public
journals and opinion "have been growing more i'avorable to
our cuuse. 1120

Yet, for the second time in a week, the

commissioners failed to evoke rmy assurances from
Russell beyond the cursory guarantees to respect the
rights 01' a uelligerent.

Russell listened to the Con-

federa1;e plea "with all the polite attention and r·igid
reserve" which characterized the English statesmen of
t.hat era. 21

To not the slightest degree did he commit

his government.

After the interviews with Lord Russell, Pierre
Host repaired to Paris w.nere he obtained an interview

18}ickett Papers, Dispatch No. 2, Yu.ncey, ltost and
Mann to Toombs, June 1, 1861.
19Illi_.
201..2i£.

21Hendrick, Statesmen of ~ Cause, 143.
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with Count ae

~orney,

the half-brother and intimate ad-

visor to Emperor Napoleon III. 22

.ltost found that the

various French political parties prevented a firm commitment of the Emperor's governmsnt beyond the staid
guarantees of the British.

He reported that the Im-

periali5ts were "not averse to see a division of the
Unite::d Stateu," but that the REd Republicans and the

Orleanists uaw in the Union's dissolution the elirnination of a naval counterpoil:le to that of Great Britain.23
Despite this very definite oppo:.:;ition by two of France's
leading political factions against the bouthern secession,
Ro::st concluded that "the O.f:.iinions of the French people
and of the government ••• are considered to be quite
favorable to our cause. 112 4
It seems that Rost, in discovering no immediate
uni'riendliness on the part of the Emperor towards the
Confederacy, expanded the attitude of the monarch to
completely reflect the sentiments of the nation.

In

so doing, the commissioner again abandoned t.he c.iuality of
objectivity so necessary to his mission.
had passed

~ince

.Hardly a month

the douthern diplomats arrived in 1'urope.

22 Du Bose, Yancey, 60?.
23:.r:ickett Tapers, Dispatch No. 2, Yanc:ey, Robt and
to Toombu, June 1, 18Gl.

r~mnn

24 Ibid.
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Yet in that short time, through the limitea establishment
of

con~acts

with individuals who avowedly professed

strong uentiments for the ;;..-iouth, ana through the bombastic generalization of attitudes which could at best
be described as sympathetic, the agents erroneously

created the image of a compassionate Europe which only
awaiteO. some sign of Southern stdbility before its full
endorsement and support of Confederate independence.
The final scene in the Confederates' first act
in Europe was played out in the House of Commons.

On

June 7, Gregory introduced a motion that the independence
of the Confederate l::itate:s be recognized by England.25
Yet, pressured by Russell and the commercial parties of
Manchet.>ter, Liverpool, and other industrial centers
which feared an immedia:te alienation with the United
States, the moticn was promptly withdrawn. 2 6
The Confederate com.missioners noted "that the
consideration of thf: motion gave rise to debate in which
great acerbity would be manifested."

Such debate would

tend to forrn opposing parties, which, in turn, would
prevent the British government "from acting impartially
when the proper moment for action should arise."

As to

25.Pickett ?ape1 s, Yancey, J\ost and Mann to Toombs,
June 10, 1861.

26~.

54
just w.l'H;n the "proper moment" should occur, the Southern

diplomu.tu agreed that :b:ngland would decide that for
herself when either the Union or the Confederacy "shall
prove strongest."

In the rn<::antime, the envoys noted that

both England and France would pursue the same policy of
observing strict neutrality until the South demonstrated
"sufficient consistency" in its internal affairs to
justify recognition. 2 7

During the two meetings of the Confederate
commissioners with Russell anu the first Parliamentary
debate over recognition, United States counter-diplomacy,
under the direction of
into action.

~ecretary

of State Seward, swung

On May 13, the day the joint British and

French Neutrality Proclamation was issued, Seward's new
appointee as Ambassador to Great Britain, Charles
Francis Adams, arrived in London.28

Scarcely one week

later, on May 21, Seward dispatched his diplomatic
29
instructions to the minister.
Basically, these instructions reflected the

27Pickett .Papers, Yancey, Rost anu Mann to Toombs,
June 10, 1861.
28Henry W. Temple, "Wi lli1:i!li H. ::>ewa1d, " in 8amue 1
Flagg Bemis, Editor, The Americar,: ~ecretaries .Qf State and
'£heir :Diplomacy: (17 vO!S., New York: 1927), VII, 52.
29Ibid., 52.
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indignation endured on the pa1·t of the United States
government through the reception -- however informal
of the Confederate commissioners by Great Britain.

In

his notorious Dispatch No. 10, which Lincoln drastically
modified on account of the original harshness of tone
and explici tne!.:ls of content, Sewar·d ordered. Adams to
protest vehemently to the British government for their
prem<.:.ture actions and declarations.30

Since, Seward

reasoned, the unofficial meetings between the British
Foreign Office and the Southern envoys were "useless
and meaningless, 11 ,they snould immediately be discontinued..
to

11

If not, the Secretc..r;y of State instructed Adams

desist from all intercourse, unofficial as well as

official," with the British government.3 1
Despite Lincoln's amenuments to the dispatch,
::>eward'e.communic8.tion came dangerously close to being
an ultimatum.

In the hands of a lesser diplomat, they

could easily have been construed as such.

dince they

threatened th£: total severence of diplomatic relations,
the inLltructions required
tion.

a

clever

and

tactful presenta-

It is to the lasting credit of Adams that .he was

30Hendrick, Lincoln'..§ 'iJur (;µb.j.ne1. (.Boston, 1946),
195-1~6.

)li;epurtment of .itu.te, Diplomatic Gorret:>t-:ondence of
the United Stateo: J~apt::1':.:> 11.ela.ting lQ. ]1oreign Affairs,
1861-1862 (W::.i.si1ington, .u.C.: 18b2), ~eward to Auam::;,

JUii'e

21, 1861, ~0-96.
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able to deliver these instr-uctions with directness without provoking Britain into :::mother Anglo-American conflict.
Adams presented his instructions to Russell in a
most thorough and courteous fashion, which "completely
disarmed the ~1 oreign Secretary. u32

Russell replied

that there was nothing unprecedented in receiving ouch
envoys unofficially, as it served to provide desired
information in a most satisfactory and convenient way.33
Concerning the Confederate delegation, Russell admitted
tha.t he had already met with them twice, though on
informal terms, ana that "he had no intention of seeing
them any more. 11 34

Although not a positive pledge, the

statement of Russell's intentions served Adams with a
major diplomatic triumph.
frustrating

th~

He oucceeded in thoroughly

Confederates' attempts to continue

direct negotiations with the

as such,

succe~rnf'ully

~nglish

Foreign Office, and,

removed bl.llother opportunity for

:::>outhern initiative.

The first efforts by the Confederate envoys to
achieve an immediate and enthusiastic recognition of

32Temple, "3eward," 198.
33nepartment of State, Diplomatic Cor·respondence, Adan.s
to Seward, June 14, 1861, 104.

34rbid.

57
independence had failed.

Despite the guarded optimism of

the Southern lobby and the bouyant naivete' of the
Confederate ministers themselves, hostile factors were
quickly arising to frustrate Confederate diplomacy.

The uncommitted aloofness of Russell, the unsatisfactory debates in Parliament, and the effective counterdiplomacy of Adams developed to thwart and contain the
initial Confederate labors.

As the summer months

approached, thC> comrnissione1s contenteci themselves with
~preading

Southern propaganda and laying plans for their

next concerted effort to win recognition.

CHAPTER IV
CON.frl:JJERA~l.1E

PJ:WPAGANDA -- A NEGATIVE A:PPROACH

Through June and July of 1861, the Confederate
commissioners concentrated their propaganda efforts in
repudiating the effectiveness, and hence, legality of
the Union blockade, and in arousing public sentiment
against the anticipated cotton famine.

~ince

they had

been excluded from any further interviews with Russell
on account of the effective diplomacy of
Ada.ms, they

~eward

and

sought a circulation of their views through

pe1sonal contacts with various political leaders, newspaper reporters and editors.

Mann soon reported that he ha.d held two favorable
interviews wi t.tl .Paul J. Reuter, the head of the Reuter

Telegraph and News Agency of kondon. 1

In acknowledging

Heuter's virtual control of the telegraph lines in London
and the news services to the Continent, Mann indicated
the enormous benefit to the Confederacy if an agreement
could be reached whereby news would be transmitted directly
from the :Jouth to Britain. 2 l'reviously, war news from

lOwBley, King Cotton, 62.
2 l'ickett .Pa_per::i, .Mann to Toombs, August 3, 1861.
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the United

~tates

to Europe came through formal communi-

cations agencies and their dispatches from New York or Boston harbor.

Since these two northern cities were cur-

rently bastions of strength in the Union camp, the news
that left these ports was obviously tinted to reflect
Northern sentiments.
The commissioner informed Toombs that Reuter
"is not only willing but anxious to furnish his correspondents .•• with the latest intelligence from both
sides. 11 3

Mann further reporteu that he and .Heuter had

agreed upon a plan for delivering the news, in code, to
a neutral party in Ireland wno would then forward the
entire communication to both the Reuter agency and the
Confederate commissioners.4

Such a plan if put into

operation, noted Mann, could effectively counteract the
preponderance of propanganaa which is "furnished in the
North for dissimination on this side of the Atlantic. 11 5
Despite the Confederate government's failure to
employ the specific recommendations of Commissioner Mann,
His, Yancey's, and host's sporadic admissions that the

0outhern propaganda prog1au1 suffered. from lack of exposure

)}ickett 1,apers, Mann to 'l'oombs, August 3, 1861.

4~.

5r-l) l.· d •
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prompted later improvements along these lines.

As

already noted, with the appointment of Henry Hotze in
November, 1861, Confederate propaganda entered a more
or·ganized, influential, and financially stable period. 6
The inability of' the diplomatic mission of Yancey, Rost,
and hunn to effectively establish a formal information
agency in l!;urope demonstrated the E>hort-sightedness of the
Confederate effort.

oubsequent Southern labors in E'urope

attempted to overcome this inadequacy.

Under Hotze,

De Leon, and others, the propaganda work begun by the
first envoys of the cotton kingdom and the native Southern
lobbyists developed into a cohesive system which sought to
counteract the Northern publicity campaigns.
The approach to propaganda activities which the
initial Confederate commission assumed was a curious
blend of inconsistency ana inaction.

On one hand, as

the Mann dispatch indicates, the ministers pressed for a
more active and persuasive propaganda policy.

Yet, in

reality, the course they actually pursued reflected the
patterns of quiescence which their instructions, British
policy, and Union diplomacy produced.
In their second aispatch to Toombs, the Southern
envoys reported

th~t

the obstreperous attempts by the

Union.ist advocates to influence public opinion had met
6

see Chapter 11 I, pages

44-45.
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with little succe~rn. 7

Rather, "the effect ha;;; been most

decidedly tu injui·e that cause and to incite British antagoniurn.11h

dince the commit.isioners noted that this

unfavorable reaction "has been so definitely the case,"
they inf orrued the i::ltate Department that they would
profit more from a policy of reserve than from one of

teme!'ity.9
J~ortr1

.LJesiring that tne publicity errors of the

suould "have full ef'f'ect on the public mind,"

the Goni'ea.erates themselves ueclineu from any active

movements so as not tu uivert attention from
tue Union propagandists. 10 As to the success of their

~ublic

approach, the envoys

expre~sed

satisfaction that their

course of action "has met WJ.th eminent success. 11 11
It is indeed dil'ficu.tt to see 1-he "eminent

success" wiiich T,he current Con1'ederate propaganda program
generated.

It is even harder to imagine a continuation

oi' tnis policy oi' limited pub.tici ty with any hopes of

gathering :;;upport.

Yet, in the following weeks, the

?Pickett l:'apera, Dispatch No. 2, Yancey, host and Mann
to Toombs, July 15, 1861.
8 roia.

91-OlLl
. '.•
lOioickett l-apers, .Dispatch 1o. 3, Yancey and Mann to
Toombs, July 15, 1861.
11~.
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Confederate

commi~sioners

reported that the irritable

tactics of the Northern sympathizers had not only brought
Britain to the point where a significant Southern
mili-r;ary victory could instigate .recognition, 12 but
also thut the anti-slavery sentiment, which existed
predominantly in Hnglana at the outBet of the war, hau
diBsipateci to a negligible factor. 13
eyes of the rniniute1s, the negative

At least in the
propa~anda

of the

;:)outh portendeu a diplomatic: triumph.
What ap:pea.rs to bt:: a paradoxical t:iituation -reports of inc.rea.uing Confeuerate popular support despite
an acknowledged paucity of

~outhern

propaganda effort --

represents in reality a case which conforms q_uite easily
to the patterne already estG.blished by the commission.

The Confederates, as in

t.r~eir

dealings with Russell,

were less con-cent to follow this propaganda approach
a~>

they were restricted to it.

Their own inabilities

and their State 1Jepartment's inadequate provisions for
an active propaganda agency certainly serve as more

plausible ex:planations for the Confederate actions than
t.t;.e casual uismist>al oJ t!rn necessity 01' such an agency

12 .r:ickett J:lap8rs, Yuncey and Rost to Toomb:;,, June 10
1861; .lJiepatch 1~0. 3, Yancey <:mu N<:mn to '.1.'oombu, July
1861.

lS,

lj

:Pickett :tape1s, Disputch No. 4, Yancey and Nann to
Toombs, August 1, 1861.
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by the envoys themselves.
statemen~s

Likewise, the optimistic

in the commission's dispatches exemplify

the ministers' habit of grabbing at loose straws of
encouragement.

The commissioners tran::>.formed the

patient non-committal utti tudes of Englund and 1!1 rance
into

l:i

glowing fa.voritit:im towards und enaorsement of

~outhern

secession.

In advocating restraint, where

there were no .:;.'H..ans for activity, a.no. in affirming
support, where there only existed the practicality of
.t;uropean .,b;Olitics, the commissioners created an illusion

of contentment within their diplomatic confinement.

Although the commi::rnione.rs pretenued satisfaction in their restrictive t:om:nunications with Russell
and with their limited publicity effort:::i in England, they
~;till

continued active negotiations with high governmen-

tal officials in 1'1rance.

interview with

~doard

for JPoreign Af'fair:.:;. l4

In mid-July, Hoot obtained an

Thouvenal, the French Minister
In familiar tE:rms, Thou venal

assured Rost thL.:lt Fnillee dusired to sec peuce reestabliehed in America, and, that for the du.cation of
the war, she woulu maintuin u strict neutrality. 15

14t;ullahan, Diplomatic nl:.:.;tory Q!. <.:onfeueracy, 119.
15i:·ickett .t'upers, .l.iispu.tch No. 3, Yancey and Mann to

Toombs, July 15, lBbl.

Yancey soon followed Rost to Paris.
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Although he

did not meet formally with either Thouvenal or De Morney,
he nevertheless formed strong opinions as to the French
position.

In particular, Yancey felt that Napoleon

regarded the French affairs in :burope "to be of more
importance" than her relations with America.

As such,

the commissioner reasoned that ]franc e woula gladly leave
any decision for Confederate recognition "in the hands
of the British Cabinet," and that l!"rance would. continue
to abide by "the current English policy.

Yancey further

reported that "reliable sources" from Spain, Belgium
and Denmark assured the Confederates t.hut their governments entertained "the most friendly feeling" towards
the ~outhern states .16

As with ]'ranee, though, these

nations would only recognize Confederate independence
when Great Britain determined to do so.
Nearly four months after the appointment of their
mission, the Southern delegates found that the original
target for their diplomacy -- Great Britain -- remained
more than ever the iocal point for any European diplomatic decisions.
all

in~icated

France, ;.)pain, Belgium and Denmark

a certain

sy~pathy

towards the Confederate

cause; yet, they also refused to grant formal recognition
1 61,ickett Papers, Dis1Jutch .No. 3, Yl.incey and Mann to
Toombs, July 15,-1861.
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without Englanct•s lead.

After July, 1861, all three

commissioners returned to London, where, for the duration

of their appointment, they directeci their efforts exclusively towards the Britis.n Foreign Office.
Reunited in hngland, the Confederates intensified their attack against the legality of the Union
blockade.

Throulsh services of the Southern Job by, they

managed to create substantial agitation in Parliament
over two delicate point~ in the blockade matter.17

In

the first place, the commissioners contended that the
blockade was in violation of the 1856 Declaration of
Paris.18

This Declaration, adopted by a European

congress. meeting in Paris after the Crimean War, stated
that blockades, in oruer to be binding, must be proven
effective.

More opecifically, a legal blockade must

be maintained by forces sui'f icient enough "to prevent

acce~s to the coast of' tne enemy. 111 9

Through statistics

of successful blockade violati0ns from the State Department and private sourcef:.i, the uiploma"Ls readily supplied
Gregory, Lindsay, and other lt,;ading lobbyists with evidence for their arguments.
1 70wsley, King Cotton, 62.

18 J?hilip ~Hern When the Guns Roared: ltforld Aspects of
1h£. American Civii
"(1re'W Y"O'rk, 1965), 56-51.
~
19
Fred L. Israel, Editor, ~ajor Peace Treaties of Modern
Hi!:ltory, 1648-1967 ( 4 vols., New York: 1967), II, 957.
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Concerning the Paris pact, the Confederates only
argued one side of the issue.

Although they persisted in

condemning the Federal blockade, they conveniently ignored another aspeut of tne Declaration -- that which
outlawed privateering.
however, did not.

Secretary of State

~eward,

He instructed Adams to enter into

negotiations with England to seek a convention of mutual
accedence to the document.20
elicit

The negotiations failed to

a:n agreement between the United States and

Britain, though, when Russell declared that, in recognizing the belligerent utatus of the Confederacy, he had
elevated the rank of their naval vessels from illegal
privateers to ·legitimate warships.21

The Foreign SecrA-

tary contendeo. that as long as the Union and Great Britain
conflicted

over the

st~tus

of the struggle in America,

there would always exi:::;t the possibility of accusations
of bad faith and of violations of the convention. 22 Despite
the failure of these negotiations, the inclination of the
United :>tates to uccede to the very pact which the Confederates claimea they violated substantially lessened
the significance of the bouthern contentions.
20 a1yndon G. Van :.Ueusen, William Henry Sewa1d (New York,
1'367), 294-295.
21Ada1us, Britain ~ the Civil War, I, 144-145.
22,1lli., 145
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Secondly, the Southern State Department and the
commissioners felt that the blockade "exposed the United
citates to the charge of contradictory diplomacy." 2 3 The
United States treated the Uonfederacy as nothing more
than rebellious subjects, yet the very exibtence of the
blockade seemed to violate this approach.

:3ince the

Union "could hardly proclaim a blockade without declaring itself a belligerent, 11 24 it appeared to the
Southerners that the United States had inadvertently
accorded the Confederate States, too, at least the infermal ranking of a belligerent.
Despite the Confederate accusations, the British
Ministry continued to maintain the policy of neutrality
whioh had been declared on May 13. 25

In recognizing

the legality of the blockade in this declaration, the
British policymakers perhaps overestimated the naval
capabilities of the Union to effectively blockade a
coast of over three thouaand miles. 26 Wevertheless,
whether in exaggeration of American naval power or in
ignorance of the geography of the Confederate coast,

23Millard, "Foreign iolicy of Confederate States," 244.
2 4Graebner, "Northern Diplomacy and .r...uropean Neutral-

ity," 55.

25see Chapter III, paf.e 47.
26Adams, Britain ~ ~ Civil ~' I, 95.
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Britain acted in a conservative, sensible, and realistic
manner.

Similarly, Hnglish acknowledgment of Southern

belligerency, though an action far short of initial
Confederate expectations, reflected the pragmatism and
realism of European politics.

England's consistent

positton was to view event::; patiently and to evaluate
situations fully before making any total commitments.
In their dispatches to Richmond, the ministers
indicated a partial, yet confused, understanding of
this pragmatic quality in European politics.27

More

than once, they informed Toombs of their confidence in
a forthcoming British and

~'rench

recognition of the

Confederacy, contingent upon the proven stability of the
South as demonstrated through the military success of
the

~outhern

armies.

In late Nay, they reported that

favorable actions concerning recognition would be
forthcoming from the major :t;uropean powers "upon the

270n May 21, 1861, the .Provisional Congress of the
Confederate ;;;tates voted to move the capital of the Confederacy from Nontgomery, Alabama, to ltic.hmond, Virginia..
The move was quickly cowpleteo: so that by the beginning
of June, 1861, the Executive Departments were actively
operating in their new seat. Davis lit.:1tee1 as .reasons for
the move the fact that the union mili.tary efforts seemed
to be directed against Virginia, and ''from no point could
the necessary measures for her defense ana protection
be eo efficiently protected aL> from her own capital."
Davis, "Message to the Congress of the Coni'ederu.te States,''
July 20, 1861, in .h.ichardson, 1Vlessag8s
.l!apers of
Confederacy, I, 117.

™
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first deciaed success w.t1ich we may obtain. n28

On July 15,

they wrote that "as soon as a favorable military event
is officially announced" they would immediately demand
official recognition of the Confederate government. 29
Again, two weeks later, they announced. that the question

of iecognition restea solely upon "military events in
Virginia. 11 3°

On July 21, 1861, the military event in

Virginia which the commissioners alluded to occurred
on the fields of Bull Run, and jubilation over this
Confederate victory set the stage for the final climactic act of the Yancey-Rost-Mann mj.ssion.

28 JJickett Papers, Dispatch No. 1, Yancey, Rost and
M~ to Toombs, Nay 21, 1861.

29

Pickett Papers, Dispatch No. 3, Yancey and Mann to
Toombs, July 15, 1861.
30Pickett .Papers, Dispatch No. 4, Y1:incey and :Mann to
Toombs, August 1, 1861.

CliAJ?TEii. V
Trlli SOUTH DEMANDS IlliCOGNITION

On

July 29, 1861, Robert :N. T. Hunter, who had

recently replaced ToollibS as the Confederate decretary
of :;)tate,l informed the commissioners of the "glorious
victory" of the Uouthern armies over the Union forces
at Manassas, Virginia.

Hunter enthusiastically reported

that the United 8tates "was completely routed, with a
loss of 15,000 in killed, wounded, or missing" out of
an attacking force estima1.ed at 60,000 men.

.E'urther-

more, the Confederate forceLJ, under the command of Generals Pierre G. T. Bueregard and Joseph

~.

Johnston,

had captureu all the artillery, ammunition and provisions of the enemy, "together with 2,500 prisoners,
several rtgirnental stano.ards, and a flag of the
1 Toombs resigned his post as Secretary of State on
July 21, 1861. Disgruntled from the beginning with
Davis' foreign policy, Toombs chose retirement from the
1'resident 's Cabinet after the initial ventures of' Confederate diplomacy had rei..iJ.ized no success. His replacement, Hunter, was a. close acq_uainta.nce of Di:l.vis, and, in
fact, had been Virginia's Livorite son c8.ndidate i'or the
Presidency of the Ooni'ederate otates. Since Davis had
recently moved the capiLal to Virginia, the u.ppointment
oi' Hunter wau seen as an attempt to "recognize" Virginia
in the CCJ.binet. Hendrick, ;Jtutesmen of Lost Cause,
151, 185.
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United States. 2
11

Embellishing his account with nwnerous references
to the complete defeat of "the picked corps of the
.Hegular Army of the United States, 11 Hunter emphasized
"the universal joy" of the people of the Confederacy at

the decisive victory.

The oecretary reported revitali-

zation of the Southern spirit in a "renewed courage and
valor."

He announced that the victory "has removed the

fears of the timid" and that it has proven beyond a
doubt "that the Confederate dtates can and will maintain

their independence and successfully resist the efforts
of thG United St.ates ••• to compel them •.• to a political
union with the North. 11 3
:Before this dispatch reached the commissioners,
however, New York and Lor.i.ucn papers had announced the

striking news.4

William li. Russell, sent to America as

war correspondent for the London Times, reported the
results of the battle in descriptions so uncomplimentary
to the Union that Britiohers of both i;ro and anti-Southern
leanings regarded "the Northern effort as doomed to failure."5

2Pickett Fapers, Dispatch No. 7, Hunter to Yancey, Rost
and Mann, July 29, 1861.
3rbid.
40wsley, King Cotton, 64.
5Adams, Britain !ID.Q_ the Civil ~' I, 177-178.
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Encouraged by William Russell's accounts of a half-crazed
and disheveled mob which had retreated in panic to
Washington before the guns of the Confederate armies, the
commissioners decided that the time was ripe for some
definitive action.

In an earlier dispatch to the otate

Department, the Southerners had expressed their intent
to present a formal demand for recognition upon the
first official reports of a Uouthern military triumph.6
The victory at Bull Run and the

subse~uent

strengthening

of the Southern position in London demanded that the
envoys abandon their complacency and assume some initiative.
The report of the victory at Bull Run seemed
also to have arrived at a

mo~t

salutary time for the

good of the commission itself.

Within the commission

seeds of discontent from previous failures to achieve a
creditable diplomatic success had divided the ministers
ovc;r certain procedural matters.

In debating on a course

of action to be followed in the event that the British
Government still refused to receive them officially and
to recognize Uonfederate independence, the envoys found
themselves at odds with each other.7 Rost und Mann

6Jee (.;hapter IV, page 69. .l:'ickett l:'apers, Dispu.tch
No. 3, Yancey and Hann to '.i1oombs, July 15, 1861.

7?ickett }apers, Dispatch No. 5, Yancey, Rost and Mann
to Hunter, Augu8t 5, 1861.
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advised to "refrain from urging a decision" from Great
Britain "until a change of opinion is effected. 11 8

Yancey,

either in awareness of the mechanics of British policy
or in acknowledgment of the failure of the mission,
suggested that the envoys resign their posts in London
and "proceed to other Governments and make the t1ame demand
or ask for a recall."9

Locked in this impasse, the

commissioners had referred the matter to Richmond for
settlement when the news of Bull Run arrived.
Confederate victory at Manassas fortuitously

Thus, the
serv~d

to

sustain the unity of spirit within the commission as it
focused attention again on a singular objective.
In the same letter "to Hunter which revealed

tlie open dissension among the commissioners, the diplo-

mats expounded on anoth(;r area of discontent wilich aff ected the mission as a whole.

The envoys deeply resented

the thorough snubbing, both socially and officially, they
had received from the british Ministry.

They reported

that tney had "not received the least notice or attention
from any member of the Government since ••• (thei.r) arrival
in .Englana."

Although they graciously announced that

8iickett Papers, Dispatch No. 5, Yancey, Rost and. Mann
5, 1861.

to Hunter, August

9ill£..
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this fact was mentioned "in no spiri.t of' complaint,"
they nevertheless advised President Davis to consider
such British actions "in weighing the conduct of this

Government toward the Confederate Statea. 11 10

With the

Southern victory at Bull Run, though, there seemed to be
no reason to doubt that the policy of uncivility would
soon be reversed.
In order to capitalize on the emotionaliem of
the moment, the commissione.rs immediately dispatched a
note to Russell urgently requesting a 1'ormal interview.11

The Foreign Secretary, having repaired to one of his country residences, delayed hio re,!.Jly for sever·al days.

When

it arrived, however, it substantially erased the optimistic spirit which had engulfed the envoys since the initial reports of First Manassas.

Addressed from his

country estate, .l:'embroke Lodge, the rejoinder neither
bore an official letterhead nor identified Earl .Russell
in any manner distinct from that of a private citizen.12
Hedundant in informality, "the almost studied insult"

lO:Pickett Papers, Dispatch No. 5, Yancey, Host and Mann
to Hunter, August 5, 1861.
11:Philip Stern, ~ the Guns Roared: World Aspects
of~ American Civil~ (New York, 1965), 7'5.
12
Pickett Papers, Dispatch No. 5, Yancey, Rost and Mann
to Hunter, :\ugu.st 5, 1861.
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of the reply cer·tainly injured the Confeuerates' pride.

13

Nore than the format of the letter, Russell's
curt reply fully aemonstrated the British resolve to
develop a policy uevoid of futile pressures of Confederate
diplomacy.

"I:;arl .H.ussell presents his compliments,"

wrote the Foreign

~.:)ecretary,

"anci would. be obliged to

them ( commission.ers) if tney would put in writing any
communications they wish to muke to him. 11 14
more.

Nothing

In this brief exchange, Russell virtually solid-

ified his earlier promises to Adams to ref rain from any
interviews with the tiouthern agents,15

He comvletely dis-

armed the Confederate representatives, and, once again,
frustrated their initiative.
Their }Jlan of action restricted to only one
possible course, the commissioners gathert:d in London to
prepare

th~

formal demand for recognition.

On August 14,

1861, they presented to Russell the latest declaration of
the allegea rigllt of the Confeaeracy to recognition from
the British government.16

At> ouch, it fully marked the

13Henarick, bt~tesmen 2.£ ~ Cause, 151.
l4l'ickett Papers, Russell to Yancey, Host and Mann,
August 7 t 1861.
15 see Uhapter III, page 56.
16

:rickett Papers, Yancey, Host and Nurm to Bussell,
Au_g. ust 14, 1861. The following paragruphs, pages 76 to
8} :J.re based. on this demand for rec ogni ti on which the
commissioners delivered to .ctussell.

apex of their

mi~oion

in

~urope,
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and has since prompted

Yancey's biographert John W. Du Bose, to comment that
"upon the reasoning of this document, and its facts,
the cause of the Confederate States will stand at the

bar of history.nl7

The commissioners began their communication to

Russell by reviewing the arguments for recognition which
they had previously presented to him in the inf'ormal
interviews of May 3 and 9.

In urging the legality of

secession as the spontaneous right of state sovereignty,

thHy recalled for Ru1:lsell the proofs of population,
productivity and area of the Confederate States which
they had formerly used to prove that they represented
neither pirates nor rebels.
to elaborate on the

The envoys then proceeded

nece~sity

to resort to privateering.

of the agricultural South

The delegates defended the

Confederate issuance of letters of marque for privateering purposes as "legitimate objects and means of warfare."
However, des11i te the

~outhern

right to defend her inde-

pendence through this cont.ra.ctual mode of warfare, the
diplomats charged that English laws of neutrality, which
forbad "the entry o.f the lJUblic and private armed vessels

of either party into Bri tis.h ports wi t1:1 prizes," operated

l7~ of Yancey, 609.
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to the

11

practical protP.ction" of United titates commerce

and to the detriment of Confederate naval operations.

The commissioners continued with an unobtrusive
explanation of their government's initial decision to
offer re(luests rather than demands for recognition,
while the proofs for the legitimacy of such action were
being demonstrated in America.

The commissioners then

entered into a lengthy description of the power of the
Confederate States.

They strtrn.:ied that Lincoln's

"aggressive policy" and "military despotism" had already
caused the states of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee
and Arkansas "to secede from the late Union" and join
the Confederacy.

Likewise, Maryland, Kentucky, and

l"'lissouri, "agitated b;y the throes of revolution," were

shortly ex:pected to follow suit.

The Southern agents

further reported that in Illinois and several other
states, "public assemblies and ••• legislatures have
condemned the war as subveruive to the

Constitut~on."

"::>triking evidences of ••• increased strength," termed
the Confederates -- or, more accurar..ely, striking
evidences of increased exa0gerationl
Concerning the progreos of the war, the Southerners dismissed as "grossly erroneous" the charges that
the slaveholding states could no't suf;:itain a prolonged
conflict with the North.

Already, they reported, the
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Soutc1 had

prevent~d

the recu.ptuI·e b.v tho Union of a:ny

single i'ortification ana had restricted the advance
of the Union armies to a mere five miles.

Southern forces

had captured "a mighty fortress on the Atlantic" (Fort
Sumter) and had taken several forts along the western
frontier.

1!1 urthermore, the agents dismissed the Union

blockade as completely ineffectual, except on the
Chesapeake, and reported that Southern ships have sailed
nout of every other port at which the attempt has been
made."

To further substantiute their arguments, the

diplomats included an anotated extract from the United
dtates census of 1850 which favorably compared the
agricultural anci manuf'acturing productivity of the slaveholding and free states.
The letter to Russell is particularly significant for it contains the first formal defense by the
commissioners of the slavery system.

Previously, the

Confederates had only extended guarded and subtle references to the peculiar institution.18

Now they openly

combatted the anti-slavery sentiment of the English
gov8rnment in a passionate, yet evasive. Plea.

They indicated, in

th~

first place, their aware-

ness that the British anti-slavery sentiment had prevented

1°see Chapter II, footnote No. 32. J:!ickett }apers,
Toombs to Yancey, Rost anu JYlann, March 16, 1861.
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the formation of friendly relations with the Confederate
government.

However, they contended that the system was

not uniquely Southern, but in fact, had been established
by the "authors of the Declaration of the Independence"

Englishmen.

"Those great and good men" succeeded in

putting into operation a plan of government which rested
"upon the great and recognized
white and bli.:ick man."
the

di~;tinction

between the

As to thE: wisdom of that course,

commissioners refused to pt:1.ss judgment.
Moreover, the agents argued that the United

States had prosecuted war for the sole purpose of maintaining the Constitution and preserving the Union.
"It was from no fear that the slaves would be liberated
that becession took place."

The envoys stressed that

"the very party in power has prepared to guarantee slavery
forever in the i::>tates if the South would remain in the
Union."

Thus, the anti-slavery elements in Britain,

reasoned the diplomats, "can have no

~ympathy

with the

North ••• (who) with a canting hypocrisy ••• would
enlist those symyathies on false pretenses."
Returning to the military operations of the war,
they reminded Rusuell of "the great battle of Bull Run,"
where "the .b't::deralists were defeuted and driven from
tht: field in open flight."

'.1.'he envoys reported that the

Goni'ederacy hati rt:cently mounted offensives of their
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own.

These operations, noteu the commissioners, are so

succef:;Jsful that the government in Washington has resigned
itself solely to the defense of its capital and the
preservation of "the remnant of its defeated and disorganized forces."
The final matter which the commissioners discussed
in their definitive defense of the Confede,ru.te position
concerned the cotton crop.

r.hey reminded the Foreign

1

Secretary that the "cotton-picking season had already
commenced" in the South.

As an inducement to British

commercial interests to break the blockade, the diplomats announced that the cotton would not only be prohibited from Southern wharves and ports until the blockade
shall be raised, but that an embargo has been placed on
the cotton for the ostensive purpose of preventing its
shipment inland through the United Btates.19

In order

19The cotton embargo plan, proposing to compel Britain
to seek cotton on ~outherri shores and to prevent the United
~tatcs from obtaining any quantities of' the stuple crop,
was a natural extension of the Davis "cotton famine" policy.
Carried to its extreme, the embargo att8mpted to hasten
the anticipated cotton famine in EurOJ)e through willful
destruction of vast stores of cotton and through legislation preventing cultivation of the fiber. ~Lis controversial amendment to the original Davie }.ilan further
alienated the foreign policy factions. Yancey, faced
with the dilemma o:f defending a policy which he definitely
opposed, yielded to the: optimistic spirit of the moment -a concession which the continua.no e of' his ap1Jointment
dictated. See Daniel, The Richmond Examiner During the
·~mr, 43, for a summary OT""views on the embargo by leaders
of the navis and Rhett-Toombs factions.
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to obtain cotton, ths agents stated that "it must be
sought for in the Atlantic and Gulf ports" of the
~outhern

states by vessels of the British merchant

mdrine ..
Yancey, Rost and Mann completed their communication to Ru:sse 11 with an intensive appeal that ·the British government extend de facto .recognition to the
Confederate States.

They expressed incredulity in that

recognition had not already been granted.
displayed confidence that

hu~sell,

Yet, they

having realized the

necessity for the establiuhment of commercial relations,
woula "take into c0nsid.er'-ltion 11 their arguments and
immediately

grant a i-orrnal acknowledgment of Confederate

sovereignty.

In its entirety, the Yancey-Host-Mann demand for
recognition, ali;hough the most ue.t'initive diplomatic
announcement of the Confeueracy, ielied wholly on the
already familiar urgumenttJ for recognition.

In summary

fashion, the diplomats recounted the }.Jrinciples for
secession, the evidences of stability, and the rights
to recognition which .hau long characterized· the oouthern
case.

Yet, in its thoroughness, the letter elaborated

on certain postulates which merit ftirther comment.
In particular, the Confederate invitation to
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the British to willingly violute the legally instituted
blockade of the United Stat8s clearly courted a declaration of war between the two powers.

It was an invitation

wholly based on the basic contentions of "king cotton"
philosophy.

The Confederates gambled that the promise

of vc;.st stores of cotton on the Southern shores, and the
pressures ot' an anticipated cotton famine in England would
surely motivate the British to procure the staple.

Al-

t.t1ough their alternative solutions indicated only a
partial understanding 01· the 1·actoru which prevented
.brJti~h

acquiescence to the Southern plan, .Rhett, Toombs,

and Yancey had

recogni~ea

and forewarned the fallacy of

the gamble.
On the matter of the blockaa.e. the commissioners
presentea a confusing ana contraaictory picture.

On one

hand, they argued that the blockade only enjoyed success

on the Chesapeake and was everywhere else as much nonexistent ae ineffective.

Yet, they curiously reported

that the Confederacy would continue to w.i thhold its cotton
until the blockaae wus proven inoperative.

It seems

the com:nissionero either placed an extravagant value on
the commercial worth of the Chesapeake or neglected to
disclocse the full ef'fectiveneos and scope of the blockade.
In view of the other egregiouu tJtatement8 within their
presentation, the contentioub blockade accounts reflect
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more than anything the desperation of the Confederate
agents to employ bombastic -- almost ludicrous -- arguments
to salvage a diplomatic victory.

The commissioners did not have to wait long for
Hwrnell 'o reply.

On August 24, in a note addressed to

the representutives of the ''so-styled Confederate .Gtates
of North America," he curtly acknowledged their communication.

He firmly reiterated the British intention to

strictly adhere to its declared policy of neutrality.
The British government, l:lu::>sell explained, "cannot undertuke tu determine by anticipation whut may be the issue
oi' the contest."

Furthermore, the Foreign Secretary

unequivocally declared that a British recognition of
Confederate inde1)endence would not be forthcoming until
"the fortune of arms or the more peaceful mode of negotiation'' should better determine the respective positions
of' the two belligerents.20

There can be no doubt as to the disheartening and
defeatist reception of Russell's letter by both the
ministers antl the State Department as revealed in the
immediate conseY,.uences of the event.

On August 24, the

very day on wuich .husse11 had i·epliea. to the Confederate

20lickett h:i.per s, Hus~>ell to Yancey, Host e. nd hann,
Augw.;t 24, 1861.
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agents, nunter

instruc~ed

them

~o

proceed to Madrid where

they were to present their ca::rn before 0pain and ask for
recognition. 21 Obviously, the communications systems
of the mid-nineteenth century prevented such an immediate

rl'sponse to the cormnissioners' rejection.

Rather,

Hunter's dispatch definitely indicated that the decision
to .redirect the Confederate aiplomatic operations in
Europe had already been made before the formal demand
for recognition.

Russell's reply only substantiated

this decision.

In early oeptember, Yancey, disgusted by the
British .Ministry, the new instructions, and his strained
relationship -wi t!1 Rost and Narm, intimated his desire to
resign from the commission. 22 Ironically, like almost
every other aspect of the Confederate miirnion to :Europe,
even this decision was not left for Yancey to determine.

On

~e1Jtember

23, Hunter informed the commissioners that

the J:'rcniden t, with

Congre~;sional

approval, had aecided

to disbanci the comrnission. 2 3
It seems that Davis had finally realized that
21 Fickett l'apers, Dispatch No. 9, Hunter to Yancey,
Rost and Mann, August 24, 1861.
22

Pickett Papers, Dispatch No. 10, Hunter to Yancey,
Ueptember 23, 1861.
23_Pickett 1iaperu, Dispatch No. 11, hunter to Mann,
2), 1861.

0eptembEH'
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the wait for recogniti.on would be a little longer than
originally anticipated.

The dispatch to Mann revealed

that, in acknowledgment of this diplomatic fact of
life, permanent, resident, Confederate representatives in
major European capitals would replace the roving ambassadorship of the Yancey-.Host-Munn commission.

Mann, himself,.

was instructed to assume the diplomatic position in

Belgium, while the other coillillissioners, until the arrival
of James M. Mason in England and John Slidell in l!'rance,
would continue to function in a reportive and advisory
capacity. 24

From October to December, 1861, the commissioners
occupied

them~rnl ves

in excursions between London and Paris

in attempts to gauge popular and governmental attitudes.
Yet, what appeared to be an insignificant and purely
routine end to their mission shortly transformed into a
period of signal enthusiasm and optimism.

The moralistic

case for Confederate recognition had repeatedly failed to
evoke any encouraging reBJ-,orwe from Britain.

But on

.November 8, 1861, all ideali::rtic anu abstract arguments
were forgotten in the verJ rbal and flu.grant violation of
Br.i tish neutraJ rights wi tll the capture of the English

steamship, 'J.'rent, by naval forces of the United Gtates.

24 Pickett l'apu·s, lJispu tch No. 11, Hunter to Mann,
23, 1861.

~eptember

C1iA.l-'TEh VI

A LAJT HOfE -- THE 11.tlliNT Ai'FAIH

The routinism which characterized. the activities
of the commiusionerb in the

~eriod

between the initiul

notice of their mission's dissolvement anu. tne formal release from their auties was abruptly shattered with the
news of the Trent affair.

Maeon and Slidell, the Confect-

erate commissioners aljpointed to replace the Yancey-Rost-

Mann mission, had boarded the British merchant vessel,
~t,

Lone.on.

in Havana, and were proceeding on their voyage to
On No.ven1ber 8, 1861, the ~Prent was hailed and

boarded in the Bahama Channel near Havana by Unitea
~tutes

naval forces under the command of Captain John

Wilkes of the Union gunboat,

~an

Jacinto.

\dlkes ordered

the Confederate diplomats forcibly removed from the decks
of the Trent and placea unuer arrest.l

Scarcely two weeks

I

later "the news of the incid.l,;nt reacheu l!;n.gland and ignited
the mo~t vociferous reaction :.:.tgainst United Jt21tes war
111 hi~ brief summary of event8 surrounding the seizure

of tne Trent is taken .from the pt?ruonal account oi' the
incident by JCJ.mes N. Ma.son. i:Jee, Mai.on, "Account of the
Trent J~xperionce," in Virginia Mi:u.;on, · .c;ui tor, The .Public
l:!lli. ™Diplomatic Corrt:sponaence of J'..ime8 M.Mason ~
bome .t'ersonul History ~ his lJaughter (Roanoke, Va...:
'I9Q"5), 208-254.
~
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policies in the entire conflict.

The general resentment at the Union action focusea on two points: freedom of the seas for neutrals and
the right to grant asylum.

Concerning these two issues,

the unofficial reaction of the English press and governmental oJficials was one of righteous indignation.

The

event provided thereafter a willing audience for propagandfa tactics of Southern lobbyists.

Yet, Southern sym-

pathizers hardly had to circulate passionate condemnations

of the seizure, for the mere factual reports of the inciaent createci its ov1n propaganda bonanza.

Tile British press immediately commenced ec!itorial
attacks on the Northern action.
WJ.iting of the London Times,

Leti by strong leaderand .Punch,

~·~Herald,

.c.nglish columnists censureci the North ati representatives
of "insolence and uefiance of almost every diplomatic conventionality. 112

They pictured Seward au a "reckless ad-

venturer," who, with Lincoln, would compel Britain to

rt:linguish her neutrality, "an<.1 by that means bring on a
European war."3

Likewise, British privatE.: citizens joined

in a critical chorus against the seizure.
an advocate of the Union cau:.;e as Henry

.Bven so staunch

~idgewick

2Jor(1an, Buro.Pe ,rn .!h£_ Civil War, 29-jl.

)ill..£., 29.

-

e.xclaimed:
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"If ~l;\•aru wants a wur with .c.ngluna., he must huve it. 11 4
i·rominent British ci tizl:ne

l~latthew

Arnold, ;Jir George

Cornewall .Lewis, and ;::iir John Acton similarly voiced
indign8. ti on at the AmE:r·ic&n challenge to British rights
as a neutral.

Henry Adums, son of tne Uniteu

~tates

ambassaa.or to Great Britain, vi1a.rned of prt:valent British

SE:ntiments in a letter from .London:
war. Do not doubt it. 115

"This nation means

Vi.hen the Trent finu.lly arrived in England, it

carried not only news of the capture but also the papers
and instr·uctions wnich the Gunl.'eaeru.te Stute DeJ.ia1·tment
6
.haa deli verea to J11auon Lilla. Slidell.
These were promptly

forwu.rued to Yancey, host tlnu Mann in London.

The South-

ern envoys hau already delivered to the British government
"a solemn remon:.>trance against the outrage perpetrated
by the

United States" when these papers arriveu..7

Now,

suppliea with fresh instructions and information, altnough all i;he mo.t8riul haC. originally been intended for

the use of Mason and t>lia.ell, the commissioners sent a

4Jordan, Euro1;e ~ t.he Civil ~, 29.
5Bailey, Diplomatic History of Arnericun Peo;.,le, )29.

6 :tiickett Papers, Dispatch No. 10, Yancey, Rost and
M.ann to Hunter, December 2, 1861.
7 Ibi<i.

-
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second note of protest to Russell.a
The dispatched delivered by the Trent contained,
in paI·ticular, statistical accounts of successful blockade violations from April 29 to Au.gust 20.

This infor-

mation constituted the bulk of tne diplomats' communication.

2.'hey insisted that the blockade was merely a

"paper" one, as clearly demonstrated by the fact that "more
than four hundred vessels huve arrivea and departed. unmolested." As such, the Union bloukade definitely violatca cri ter·ia for blockades establif>hed i.n the Declar-

a ti on of 1:-'aris.

The c o.u.uniseioners challenged the signa-

tory yowe.rs of tne l1aris pact "to make good their declaration" and to consiuer as not binding the blockade which
the 0outh, through its eviuences, haa proven ineffect-

ual. 9
Secondly, the commissioners again turned to the
matter of cotton.

They re,t,ortea. that the

~outh

antici-

pated a favorable action by the British against the blockade "not only by their own declaration, but by the nature
of the interests affeeteu by the blockade."

They reminded

riusuell "that the only certaiu and sufficient source of
cot ton" r·eu tea in the Con1e<lt::racy.

r urthermore, the
1

8.riicKett .rapers, hlspatch No. 10, Yancey, .Host and
Mann to Hunter, .uecember 2, 1861.
91)icKe tt I'apers, Y<:inc ey, Hust and. Mann to 1\ussell,
Novewber 29, 1861.
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Confederates proposed that cotton provided a livelihood
aa much for the people who planted and raised the utuple
ab

!'or t.hoBe who t.ransported

<.md.

manufacturecl. it.

In

thiB :oense, then, the blockade -- ineffective though it
may be -- still pe1sisteu as a physical impediment "to
the general intere::;ts of man.kind, so many of whom depend
for their means of living" on the supply of cotton.

Thus,

the Collilllissioners concluded, the illegality and ineffect-

i VEness of t11e blockaue "anu tne great interests of the
neutral commerce 01· i;ile world" categorically demanded
thut the British governwent "should take d€cieive action
in Ct.ec:laring the block8.de inefft:0cti ve. 1110
The Lauthern envoys shortly delivered a similar
note to Thouvenal, the ¥rench Foreign Minister, in which
t.ney explained

th~

cotton fa.mine, illegal blockade, and

public sentimentality.11

host reported that the Minister

expresseci "astonishnient" at the list of blocka<ie evasions
and promistd "to take the matter into serious consiaera tion. nl2

Encouraged by the partial inter·est -- not

commi truen1, -- of '.l.'houvenal and the

reaction~

of the English

lO}_)ickett }apers, Yancey, ho:::3t anu .Mann to Hussell,
November 29, 1861.
lli:'ickett ?ayers, ..liost to Pre.sident lJavia, December 24,
1861.
12

~-
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pre8s and populace, the corruaissioners enthusiastically
reported u. decided. swing

01·

support to the t3outhern cause.

In inc.:.ividual letters to Hunter each com.missioner
proceeded to elaborate on the favorable change of opinion in Europe oince the Trent affair.

Yet, even more

interesting than these ordinary accounts of British and
French public sentiment was the amount of credit which
each minister trieu to claim for himself in the apparent
alteration of the .European clim!;l.te of opinion.

Seen in

retrospect, this tendency on the part of the commissioners to offer inqividual rather than collective appraisals
01' their efforts reflected both the late-developing fric-

tion among the commissioners and their dissatisfaction
with the mission as a whole.

To salvage some credit

i·rom the Jtate Department for a mission which had courted
failure since its conception, "the envoys turned to a selfappraisal of their respbctive efforts.

Mann enthusitiBtioally rE:ported t.tlat Confederate
recognition "will not be much longer delayea. 11

He noted

that Great Britain was "in downright earnestness" to seek
amends to the humiliation suffE:reu wi tti the sei:ture of the
r1·ent.

1

"Her voice, 11 commented the envoy from Virginia,

"will now be .found in her sword."

As for credit for this

ostensible British sE:ntiment, Mann u.umitted that "by never
losing sigbt for a moment 01 the object for which ••• (he)
vm~.

appointed," he huu succeea.ed "iu opening channels of

communi~ation

realm. 11

with the most important personages of the

Ht: aeclaimeu Loru :t>almerston, the

as "a noble statesman, 11 whose
forty years ago."

11

.Prim~

Niniater,

heart is as young as i t was

It is doubtful that Mann and :tialmerston

ever met, but apparently this was an incidental formality
which could hardly affect the familiarity implied by the
sophomoric Ambrose Mann. 13
Root, who had been appointed to lead_ the negotiations in France, similarly reported that through his
ability to perform ":tnything calculated to advance our
cause" a favorable change of opinion had occurred in the
Bmpero.r 's government.

He noteu ·that his astioc ia ti on vii th

mei;1bers of the l'aris Ministry "hau been more and more
friena.ly" and that Thouvenal hau s-ce;J.ted "that no one
coulo havt: done or accomplisheu more" t.tlan commissioner
host.

What the Southerner accom_pli:shed was scarcely sig-

nificant, yet he confidently reported that within months
},rd.nee "would come forward anu commtlnd peace. nl4

The. thirc. corn.missioner, William Yancey, imitated
his a::>socia-ces in both the substance of his dispatches and
thL self-acclaim i'or his efforts.

A further- rabuttal to

13Pickett Papers, Dis.[;atch No. 10, Mann to Hunter,
December 24, 1861.
14.Pickett Papers, Robt to iJctvis, December 24, 1861.
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his biographer'b cl.aim that Yancey was a super-patriot
manifests itself at tnis time.

Throughout the mission,

Yancey hau a.tways been the first to express discontent
with the fruitless efforts to win recognition.

Soon after

the formal demand for recognition had failed miserably in
August,

.h.c:

mission.15

had intimated his desire to resign the comHowever, with tne Trent affair, Confederate

diplomacy, through no efforts of its own, found.itself
temporarily in vogue again.

Yancey promptly reversed his

resignation intentions, and in a letter which e1aphacized
his de(.!ision "to lay

a~ide

all private consiu.era.tions, 11

he a!'firrued. his resolution to remain with 'the misaion. 16
True to this pattern, though, Yancey would not hesitate
to resign the commission a.gain when the Confederate cause
fell from public approval -- an action hardly characteristic of a devoted patriot!
Attemptin_g to ha;ten the Southern demise from popul~r

favor, United 6tates Secretary of State Seward and

Union Minister Adams effectively a.rrangea a graceful retreat from the brink. of war with Britain over the
i:dsue.

~:rent

1Jes.1Ji te the poyu.Lar outcrif::S to t.t1e contrary,

neither ti'1e Uni tea States nor the B1 i tish government
15

i::>ee Ghapter V, _vu.ge 84 '

16 .l:'icke't t h1_µers, Yancey to liw1ter, November 30, 1861.
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uebired

a

formal conflict with each other.

Acting upon

this retilization and in awareness, too, that the South
had by itself proven to be a formidable opponent, Seward
issued hit:l formal reply to

Britain'~

accusations in mid-

:Uecember, 1861.17
Seward. contended tnat although Captt:i.in Wilkes
haa. operateu without specific instructions from the United
~tates government, his action wa~ entirely juHtified. 18
However, uince the Gonfeuerate commissioners -- legal contru.bu.na of war though they may be -- were not taken before
an American

pri~e

court for aujudication of status, they

would immeuiately be released. 1 9

Though short of a formal

apology, .the action still represented a "sacrifice of
much national pride and self-glorification. 1120
The British Ministry similarly accepted the Seward explanation as a substantial compliance with its
. 21 By the time Nason and Slidell reached London
d emunas.

17 Glyna.on G. Van lJeusen, Willia1u Henry t>eward (New

York, 1967), 31).
18 nepartment of State, niplomatic Correspondence of the
Uni·tea t>tates, Qewaru to Acu:.:.ms, lJecember 27, 1S6I, 12-14.
19~.

20 Chandler,

11

lJiplomatic

Hi~tory

of Confeueracy," 45 4 •

21Adams,·Britain andfil Uivil ~' II, 2)2.
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at the end of January, 1862, amends had long been reached
wi tl1 the British government.

whole affair cer·tainly

st~nds

. 11he cri::>is had passed.

The

as a tribute to the diplo-

matic ability of Ad.ams, who, in the interlude between the
first .tepo1·to of t1rn incident and the formal statement of
~ea·.1rci,

managed to placu.te the British Foreign Office.

Adums' tuct and

~eward's

diplomacy insured. a swift pacif-

ic settlement which consequently "prevented any special
advantages to the Confederacy as hau been· expected from
.
,,22
the ••• seizure.

Adams, in fact, writing shortly after

the arrival oi' Mabon and Sliae11, metaphorically compared
the Tren! affair to a sha.rp thunderstorm, "which has
burst without doing any harm, a.nu the consequences has
been a decided improvement of 'the state of the atmosphE:re. 112:>

Wh:Lle wheels of .Nor-r;hern diplomacy still turned

to frustrate adverse international reaction to the Trent
episode, Loru John ltussell replied to the Confederate
commiusioners concerning their two
November.

prote~t

On December 7, the.Foreign

notes of late

Secret~ry

delivered

22 c11andler, "Diplomatic Hiutory of Confederacy," 454.

. 23.,, orthing ton a. 1! ord, Eai tor, A 9.vc le of Adams Letters,
1861-1865 (2 vols., Boston: 1920), I, Charles Francis
raaIDs'tOHenry Adams, l!,ebruary 21, 1862, 114.
1
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to -ihe &outuern diplomats hi:.3 very cur-c ana. blunt answer
to their demunde.
anci

He acknowledged their provioua letters,

then explicitly announced. his refusal, "in the present

state of affairs, ••• to enter into any official communication with them. 11 24
Hussell's reply struck hard. at the core of "king
cotton" diplomacy.

Yancey, enraged by the brevity and

terseness of the rejoinder, callea for an immediate
counter-reply. 25 However, Rost and Mann restrained him
from further communication vii tu iiUE:H:iell. 26

The l!'oreign

::Jecretary •i.:, note, the last goverrnuental c orre1::1pondence
with the commissioners, unequivocally revealed the British
resolve to avoicl an unnecessary war with the Unitecl. 8tates
in order to asoure a regular supply oi' cotton for its
textile manufac.turers.

The theory of "king cotton" lay

exposed as "a delusion at the first test. 112 7
Following the letter of Russell, the ministers restricted themselves to purely reportorial functions.
Their prid.e f:3orely deflated, -chey entered into no further

24f'ickett l'a,l.Jers, Russell to Yancey, Rost ans Mann,
December 7, 1861.
25pickett Payers, Yancey to Hunter, :December 31, 1861.
26r··t·l.Cl.
-

27Henurick,

btatesruen .2£. ~ Cause, 151.
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communic.:ations of any importance in the weeks before the
formal termination of their mission.
not une.1. pect:J.ntly, that he wished

11

Yancey admitted,

to leave here very

much," and, upon the arrival of Mai:wn and Slidell, he
woulci "do so at once. 11 28
Commissioners Macon and oliuel;L finally reached
London on ,January 29, 1862. 2 9· Their mission now officially diBbandea, Yancey, Rost and Hann went their separate
ways.

Mann, previously appointeu to a diplomatic position

in Belgium,

p~oceeued

to that nation where he. anticipated

to "negotiu.te ••• the first treaty ever. concluded by the
Confederate 8tates.n30

Pierre Rost remained in the con-

genial atmosphere of Paris until the arrival of Slidell,
and

then proceeded to 8pain.3l

Finally, Yancey, having

acimitted tha"t he "hardly made up ••• (his) mind as to
32
what to do,"
returneu to the Confederacy where he assumed
a benate seat from his home state of Alabama.33
28

~ickett ~afers, Yancey to Hunter, December 31, 1861.

2 9Mason to Hunter, January 30, 1862, in Mason, ~ £!
l"lason, 257-258.
30pickett Papers, Mann to Davis, February 1, 1862.
3lpickett Papers, Dispatch No. 1, Slidell to State Department, .111 ebruary 11, 1862.
3 2Pickett Papers, Yancey to Davis, January 27, 1862.

33 Du Bose, 14££

£f. Yancey, 620.

98
~urpri~ingl.y,

"to the very end, the commissioners

still expressea a feeble optimism in the inevitability of
recognition.

In their last dispatch to Richmond, dated

January 27, 1862, Mann and Yancey reported that although
they could not predict the form which intervention would
assume, they felt sure "that it will take place in a
short time.":54

::>uch confidence, although now fading in

certitude, ha<i been consiste.nt in t11e commissioners• dispatches since the inception of the mission.

However, the

reports of an imminent re.c.:ognition -- reports which permeatbd the initial letters of the mission ten months

seemeu, by this time, only hollow echoes.

earli~r

The first Confeaerate mission to Europe, a mission
vihich hC1.a courted i'ailure and SKe,t;ticism since its inaugEra tion, ended in futility.

'1:he primary objectives

of rec.:ognition and intervt::ntion hau not been realize<i.
1.1he course ol' the ciout.uern diplomu.ts was largely staked

out for them by events, c:.nd tne O!Jt:rations ·that they undertook

seem~u

less guiaeu by Confeaerute initiative than by

Union ac.:tions a.rid British reactions.

Confeuerate diplo-

macy, from the start buoyed.by "king cotton" and the
righteousness of the cause, aiscovt..red in less than a year
that economic theory and political morality could not compete with the bitter realities of international power politics.
34Pickett Pa1Jers, Dis1;a tch No. 14, Yancey and Mann to
Hunter, January 27, 186~.

CONCLUSION

The fate of the diplomatic mission of Yancey,
Rost and Mann was inexorably bound to the success or
failure o:f the "king cotton" theory.

When it failed to

prostrate England and France before it in supplication,
it removed the very foundations on which the initial
Confederate envoys based their commission and relied
for their arguments.

The South had started the war

with cotton as the primary entry on the positive aide
of her secession ledger.

Upon the staple crop she

had built her society, and under the banner
cotton", she dared attempt independence.

11

lcing

Though power-

ful enough to command the respect of the leading commercial nations of the world, cotton could not produce the
sovereign status the Confederacy sought.
"King cotton" diplomacy, from the very beginning,
had been an enormous gamble.

~laying

with this one

principal asset, the Confederate States had sought to
pressure Europe into recognition of her independence.
Unfortunately for the·South, cotton was not the only
l

trump in this game of international political and
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economic coercion.
The South soon recognized that Great Britain
controlled the diplomacy of Eu.rope as pertained to the
question of Confederate recognition.

When, and if,

England acted would determine the position of the
major continental powers.

Yet, there were too many

factors which prevented Britain from extending more
than a conventional acknowledgment of Confederate
belligerency.·
In the first place, such economic pressure as
the loss of cotton would ordinarily bring never developed
to the point anticipated by the Confederacy.

On account

of an overzealous production of Southern cotton in the
years immediately preceding secession,
was beset with a cotton surplus.

Gr~.at

Britain

Despite the coercive

cotton embargo of the Confederate States, it would take
nearly two years for this surplus to be ooneumed; and,
by that time, a profitable cotton flow would a.gain have

been restored between the South and Great Britain to
supplement the wartime supplies from Egypt, Mexico,
and India.

Similarly, the English merchant class

benefited from the war profits it was able to attain
through sales and loans, at high prices and interest
rates, of the manufactured products which the South
most desparately needed.
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Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the
failure of cotton was its inability to·produce a public
outcry against the unemployment and economic hardship
its absence purported to cause.

Except for the fearful

warnings of the few who cautioned about the impending
famine, Yancey, Rost and Mann recordea virtually no
grievances directed against a famine already in existence.

Although the cotton famine did not reach its

peak until the winter months of 1862-1863, even then
the masses in the textile centers did practically nothing
to turn public opinion beyond the sympathy for the
North which they manifested throughout the war.
Governmental subsidies and private donations kept the
potential sufferings at a minimum; but, in reality, the
absence of a prolonged threat to their welfare kept the
inconveniences and grumblings of the affected workers
substantially contained.
There were, of course, several other external
factors which prevented a firm British move towards
recognition and intervention.

The possible vulnerability

of England to a war with the United States which alliance
with the Confederacy would certainly bring, and the
fact that the majority of her people opposed slavery
and held true to this position throughout the struggle
added strength to the non-interventionist camp.
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reasons, though, important as they may be, were only
components of the principal arguments which prevented·a
.British commitment to the

~outh.

Likewise, the effec-

tive counter-diplomacy of the Union was not sufficient
in itself to prevent an active British position.

In

the end, the failure of cotton as a commercial inducement sealed the fate of Confederate diplomacy.
The inadequate foundation for the Southern
foreign policy was, of course, the root of the Confederate diplomatic failure.

~trict

adherence to the

philosophy of "king cotton" precluded a flexibility of
ac'l;ion and vitality of performance which hampered the
Confederate diplomatic effort from the start.

The

commission's restrictive instructions, inadequate resources,
insufficient planning, and, in particular, the unsatisfactory selection of the diplomats themselves, all contributed to suppress any initiatives which the .Confederates
might seek.
The argument defended by Owsley that cotton
constituted a sensible ana pragmatic base for Con.federate
diplomacy is misleading.

'.l.'he potential coercive power

of cotton demanded some reliance on the staple by the
young Confederate government.

Cotton, however, neither

ordered total diplomatic dependence nor the.blind rejec-

tion of alternative approaohef:l.

The secessionist
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Southerners rallied to the cause of their bogus "king"
only to be misled by impassioned, yet exaggerated,
arguments.

The inadequate foundation of the Confeder-

ate foreign policy provided a lasting obstacle to the
successful execution of

~outhern

diplomacy.

Granted,

external 1'actors arose to hasten the collapse of
Southern foreign policy, but the vulnerability of such
an inadequate policy had, from the start, guaranteed
its failure.

With no substance to their arguments, no

acceptance of their offers, and no reward for their
efforts, the first envoys of the cotton kingdom met
defeat at every turn.

They found their course of action

constantly dictated by events.

They moved as the tide

of Union actions and British reaction fluctuated.

Ye't,

"

in this adverse situation, which, except for the brief
reprieve of the Trent a!'fair, deteriorated with each
month of the mission, the commissioners held firm to
their idealistic confidence.
Unfortunately, their optimism in the power of
cotton and faith in the righteousness of the Confederate
cause often clouded the envoys' observations of the
true picture in h)i.rope.

This lack of perspective

was reflected in their reports to Richmond.

As a

result, dispatches claiming that recognition was
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imminent were forthcoming from Yancey, Rost, and Mann
with equal animation as early as May, 1861, ana as late
as January, 1862.
Perhaps the basic reason why the three ministers
persisted in relating such encouraging· news to the
Ccnfederacy. was the natu1·e of the contacts which they
had established in London and Paris.

For the most part,

their liaisons were aristocratic gentlemen of the
Southern lobby -- men who identified with the aristocracy
of the tiouth and who saw in that culture one which closely
re::>embled their own.

These gentlemen viewed the Southern

version of democracy as more in tune with the British
view; ana th€ very fact of the potential dissolution of
the Union fortified their belief that the h:nglish version
was superior.
Throughout the mission in Great Britain and France,
the commissioners only
caliber.

associat~d

with men of aristocratic

They never really became involved with the

common people and so could never relate to the 8tate
Department the actual solidarity of opinion of the masses
for the Union.

This inability on the part of the

Southern envoys to effectively and completely view the
whole European scene and analyze all opinions -- the masses
as well as the gentlemen -- was the si.gnal failure of
Yancey, Host and Mann as d.iplomats.
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The amateuri.sm of the commiasioners, reflected
in their excessive optimism and poor reportorial
ability, coupled with the inadequacies of Confederate
foreign policy.and the pressures of other external
factors, posed diplomatic obstacles too great to
.overcome for the struggling

Gonf~deracy~

A mission

that began with profound expectations of imminent
international recognition ended in subservience to
those impediments.

The Confederates gambled that their

policy of economic coercion anci moral certitude could
satisfactorily a.chi eve their foreign p::>li tic al objectives.

Europe countered with a deliberative policy based on
intern~tional

realities ana political pragmatism which

ult.imately, and completely, dethroned "king cotton."
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United. States Department of ::itate. Diplomatic Corresponaence of the United ~tates: ~apers Relatinea to
l!,oreign Affairs, ~-1862. Washington, 15.c.:
Government ~rinting Off ice, 1862-1863.

---

The letters and lnstructions· of Beward and
Adams were particularly useful in tracing the operations of Union counter-diplomacy. They revealed
the low regard for Confeaerate ministers and activities held by those two leading .figures of Northern
diplomacy.
?ublished .:t'ri vate t·.i.anuscripta and Contemporary Literature
Christy, David. Cotton ~ ~: .Qr. ~lavery .!!! ~ Light
.Q.f. Political Economy. Cincinnati: Moore, wll=
satch, Keep and Uo., 1855.
Christy first phra:sed the term "king cotton~'
This work expounds the theory upon which ::>outhern
diplomacy rested.
Daniel, Freuerick ~., editor. The Ricrunond E:xaminer a.uring ~ ~' 2£. tne Writ'Iiigs .Qf i2!!!1 M. Danie!:New York: 1868.
Daniel contributes many insights on the formation of Confeuerate foreign policy anu the implementation of t!1at policy auring the war years. His
comments on tne cotton emburgo were particularly
interesting.
Davia, Jefferson.

The Rise and Fall of the Confea.erate

Government.~volumeS:- ~York: Appleton,

18S1.

'.l.'his history 01' the Confederacy by 1 ts l-1resident
reveals many of the iaealistic notions which guided
Davis in choosing the "cotton famine" policy. Volume II defends his diplomatic decisions.
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Du Bellet, Paul.

"The Diplomacy of tne Confederate Cabinet." v~ashington, D. C.: Mcmuscript Di vision,
Library of Congress, 1862.

Du Bellet waB a displaced Southerner who resiaea in ~aris throughout the war. His suggestions
to the Confeaerate ministers on how to conduct their
diplomacy were ill-received, which prompted him
to write tnis critique. Although several of the
Du Bellet papers were published for the Civil War
Centennial commemoration in Richmond, Virginia,
this particular paper was not. Only a limited
number of copies of the Du Bellet article have been
printed.

Dumond, Dwight, euitor. ;.:iouthern Editorials on Secession.
Gloucester, Mass.: ~eter 0mith, 1964.~
This work gives a representative sampling of
the prevalent secession arguments in the years immediately preceding the war. It provided a further
understJ.nding of the widespread popularity of the
legality of st:cession and confidence in the power
of cotton.
Ford, Worthington Chauncey, editor. ~Cycle of Adams
Letters, 1861-1865. 2 volumes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 00:-;-T92u.
'1'his work contains more private correspono..ence
of Ambassador Adams tllan official diplomatic communications. The letters were useful in revealing
Ad.ams ' fJri va te sentiments as regards the Confederate ministers anu their aetivities.
Mason, Virginia, editor. The ~ublic Life ~ Diplomatic
Uorresponuence of James M. Mason with ~ome :Personal History bYh1s JJaughter. Hoanoke-;-Va.:0tone .Frinting and. Manufacturing Co., 1~03.
The diplomatic correspondence in this work is
selective. Ma~;on't5 account of the Trent
affair was particularly useful and informatlve.

hit~hly

Hwrnell,

~:iir

Vdliiam H.

volumes.

~ Diary North and t>outh.
2
New York: Harper and Bros., 186).

Hus:.:;ell'l> work reveals much interesting material on the initial confidE:nee of the South in a
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cotton-based diplomacy. The records of his contacts
with tiouthern exponents of the "king cotton" theory
reveal the universality of opinion on the doctrine.

i..iiuemann, B. B. and L •. Friedman, editors. ~urope Looks
~ lli Civil ~· New York: Orion .Presa, 1960.
This anthology of contemporary Buropean newspaper, magazine ana. individual observations of the
American war is more popular than reliable.

0econdary Sources
Books
Adams, B. D. Great Britain and the American Civil War.
2 volumes. New York: Longmans, Green ana c"C57;"
l':J25.

On a par with Owsley's work, Adams, however,
deals specifically with Bnglish relations with both
the Unitea ~tates anu the Confederacy. His approach
is topical, anu generally, quite conclusive.
Bemis, :::>amuel 1'1 lagg, editor. The American ::5ecretaries
of ota"te anu_Their lJi~IOiiiac~. lO volumes. New
Y'Or.K: A. A. Knopf, 1927-192 •
Henry W. Temple'o brief biography of ~eward
in Volume VI of this series is undistinguished.
He covers little of tne Civil War diplomacy of
de~ara. except for the initial instructions to
Adams and. his debatable scheme to declare war on
.H'rance to unite the North and the t>outh in a
common cause.
Callahan, James .M. Diplomati.c Hibtory of lli ::>outhern
Confeueracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins ~resa,
ljOl.
This work ha~ been entirely surpassed by
Owsley'f:l .King Uotton Diplomacy with one notable
exception. Calfahan records ui~sent within Southern
ranks concerning the formation of Confederate foreign .volicy, while Owsley completely ignores evidences of disagreement.
J"Jonald, David, editor.

-.r/hy the North Won ~ Civil ~·
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Baton liouge, La.: L.t>.U. Press, 1960.
This contuins Norman Graebner's article,
"Northern Diplomacy and European Neut.rali ty."
Graebner defends t.he t.hesil:3 that Southern diplomacy
could not compete with the "politics of power"
which characterized European foreign relations.
Vuberman, Martin B. Charlel.:l Francis Adams, 1807-1886.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961.
This outstanding biography of the United
i:>tatel.:l Civil War minister to Jmgland relies heavily
on the papers and works of Adams.
Du :Bose, John

·~d therspoon.
The Life and Times of William
Lowndes Yance:[. Birmingham, Ala.: lwberts and

~on,

1892.

This account oi' Yancey's contributions to the
Southern secession movement is overly favorable,
yet still i::; significant for its discussion of
Yancey's anti-"cotton famine" sentiments. Du Bose
sheds some light on the objections raised against
tllis policy by Rhett, Toombs and Yancey.
henurick, Burton J. Lincoln'l.:l War Cabinet. Boston:
Little, Brown and co.~ 1946.
Hendrick contributes a minor, but informative,
account of ::>ewaru's diplomacy. }'articular emphasis
.hau been 1;laced on .D:i_uµatch No. 10, :::>eward to Adamo,
which threatened the severance of diplomatic ties
with England if the British government continued to
receive the Confeuerate commissioners.
~tatesmen or the Lost Cause. New York:
Literary Guild Of America, 1939.

C.i'.1a_pter V, -"A Diplomatic De but _tn .England and
.!!'ranee, 11 treats very .l.it)l tly the initial
mit:Jsion of Yancey, .itoat and Mann.

~>outhern

Jordan, Donaldson and Bowin J. l:'ratt. Europe ~ ~
American Civil ~· New York: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1<)31.
Organized in Stctions on :B1rance and Great
Britain, emphaf=>is is on European diplomacy and
opinion rather tnan the efforts of Union and Con.;..
federate diplomats.
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Malone, Dumas, editor. ..iJictionary of American Bioe;ra~hy.
~2 volumes.
New York: ~cribner•s bons, l9?6- 4.
The biographical sketches by Frank L. Owsley
on f.lann ana Laura White on Robert fillett were useful for background material and early bibliographic
guidance.
OWsley, Frank L. King Cotton Divlomacy: Foreign Helations
of the Confea.erate f.:ltates of America. Hevised
edition. Chlcago: Univ. oTCnicago Press, 1959.

The standard survey of Confederate foreign
relations, Owsley's study is massive in scope, yet
decidedly pro-8outhern in approach. He omits much
which would suggest divided opinions among Southern
policy-makers concerning the most beneficial plan
of diplomacy. The theme of the work' is cotton,
but Owsley appears more apologetic at its failure
than objective. Chapters I and II, "The :B,oundation of Confea.erate Diplomacy," and "The First
.bnvoys of the Cotton Kingdom," give a chronological survey of the development and implementation
of ~outhern policies with the Yancey-Rost-Mann
mission.
J:atricK, Hembert W. Jefferson .Uavis and his Cabinet.
Baton Rouge, La.; L.~.u. Press;-1944.
This study contains brief discussion of dunter
anu Toombs but emphucizes Davis' relations with
the permanent Gabinet which was established in
l!'e bruary, 1862.
~tern,

..i:·hilip. ~ the Guns iwar·ed: vforld Aspect~ of
the American Ui vil ~~ar. Gara en Ui ty, New York:
.lJoubleaay, 1965.
This work i~ a poor summary of European ramifications of the Uivil War.

Van Deusen, Glyndon G. l/v'illiam Henry oeward.
Oxforo Univ. rress, 1967.

New York:

The li:i.test anu perhaps best· monograph on ~eward,
this work deals ex tern3i vely wi tn his Civil War
diplomacy. The autt10r offers particular insights
to the controversy over the Declaration of ~aria.
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\~esley,

Charles H. ~ Gollapse of the Confederacy.
Viashington, lJ. G. i Associated l'ublishing Co.,

1937.

This survey of reasons behind the eventual
i'ailure of' the Confea.erate government emphasizes
reliance upon cotton.
l'eriodicals
Adams, H. "Why Did Not Englc..;.nd Recognize the Confederacy?"
l1lassachusettes Historical ~ocie·ty J?roctoedings,
LXVJ (1936-1941), 204-222.
This brief article reviews the principal reasons for no further .Britieh commitment to the South
beyond the recognition of Confeuerate belligerency.
The reasons li~ted. are the standard explanations.
Baxter, James P. "Briti~h Govt;rnment and. Neutral Rights,
1861-1865," American Historical Review, XXXIV
(October, 1928), 12-31.
Baxter demonstrates that the Civil War reversed
the traditional situation of Uniteu States attemptti
to maintain neutral rights against English encroachment. 1ittle discussion of oout.hern diplomacy to
sway the British one way or the other appears •
.Blumenthal, Henry. "Confederate Diplomacy: Popular Notions and International Realities," Journal of
Southern History, XX.XII (May, 1966), 151-171:'11.h.is article blastt.i Confederate diplomacy as
too unrealiotic to compete with the actualities
of European power politics.
Burnett, hdmund u., editor. "Dispatch from the British
<..:onsul at Charleston to Lora. JL.hn Hussell, 1860,"
American Historical Heview, XVIII (July, 1913),
78)-787.
'l'his contains much important information on
debates in the Democratic presidential noml.nating
convention over tr~aties to be offered by the Confeueracy to .huropean powers, if the failure of the
North to grC:1.nt concessions to tne slavehola.ing states
resulted in sece~sion.
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()handler, Walter. "Diplomatic History of the Southern
Confederacy," Confederate Veteran, X.X.XI (Dec.,

1922), 453-458.

A brief and datea attempt to summerize operations ana development of Southern diplomacy, it
affords some information on the origins of the
"cotton famine" yolicy.
J)il.iard, Anthony w. 11 v1illiam L. Ytincey: The 8incere and
Unfultering Advocate of ~outhern Rights," Montgomery (Alabama) Daily Aavertiser, April 15, 1893.
Tne title of t1ds biased article speaks for
itself. lt refle<..:tes tne influence of IJU Bose's
interpretation of Yancey.
ljU

Bose, John Witherspoon. "Uonfederate Diplomacy,"
0outhern Hi1:1torical ~ociety iia,eers, XX.XII (1904),
161-105.
This offers defense of the "cotton famine"
aoctrine.

____

.,,,....... •

\'/illiam L. Yancey in History," Richmond
Times, October 31, 18~9.
11

Du Bose further enlarges the patriotic halo
which he l)lanted on Yancey with his biography.

l"ioore, J. J:>. "Lincoln ano. the Escape of the Confederate
Commissioner A. Dudley Mann," Illinois State Historical Gociety Journal, LVII (0pring, 1964), ~
2)-29.

Moore traces the route of Mann from the ~outh
to ..tmgland and sugge~' ta that Lincoln misseu a great
opportunity to capture the commissioner when he was
in Washington.
l~'ii llard,

.H'lora.

~Hates,"

"~'he :B'oreign .Policy of the Confederate
Cunfederate Veteran, XX.VI (June, 1918),

241-246.
'i1hit> brief i:::t.rticle reviews the various alternative aiplomatic plans open to the bouth at the

outset of ti1e war. l"iillard defends the "cotton
famine" policy as logical and necessary.
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Rainwater, F. L. "Notes on Southern Personalities:
A. Dudley Mann, Pierre A. Rost, William L.
Yancey," Journal of Southern History, IV
{1938), 209-227. The "Notes" present very brief biographical
aecounts of the commissioners. It is particularly
worthwhile for the sketch on Host, who nowhere is
mentionea in the D.A.B.
Venable, A. L. "'•Ii lliam L. Yancey' a 'fransition from
Unionism to '-:>t:...i.tes' Hights," Journal of .::>outhern
Ifi~tory, X (August, 1944), )31-388.
The article traces Y.Jncey 's career from that
of a conservative, Unionist Congressman to secessionist.

Bibliographic Aids
In aodition to the bibliographies which were contained in the various secondary sources used, several
standard bibliographic materials were consulted throughout the composition of the paper. Of 1;articular note,
were the reviews and citations of curr"ent publications
in the various scholarly journals which were consulted.
These included: American Historical Rbview, Civil War
History, Foreign Affairs, Journal of American Hist~,
Journal ol' Southern Histor;y_, .Mld-Amerlca, Missiseipl
Valle~ HiBtorical Review, and-:ni'e Paciflc Hiatorica
Review. Below are the standard bibliographic aids used.
American Historical Association. Writings £!!:.American
History. 46 volumes. Washington, D.C.: Government ~rinting Office, 1902-1903, 1906-1940,
1948-1958.
This series catalogues by year the various
scholarly writings on American history. Although
it is far frolli being up to date, it still serves
as a valuable bibliographic maj;erial.

Bailey, Thomas A. ~Diplomatic History 2.£ ~American
People. 7th ed.i tion. New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1964.
Chapters 22 and 23, "The Early Crises of the
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Civil War" and "The Collapse of King Cotton Diplomacy," give a satisfactory general summary of
the events and issues which highlighted Union diplomacy during the war period. This work was useful as an early bibliographic guide.
Beers, Henry ?. Bibliographies_.!,!! American History.
New York: H. w. Wilson Co., 1938.
l:hapter IV, "Diplomatic History," contains
references to early bibliographic aids.
Bemis, Samuel Flagg and Grace c. Griffin. Guide to the
Di~lomatic History 2f !h! United States, ~
~.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1935.
Though over forty years behind· the times, this
work still stands as the foremost guide to writings
on American diplomatic history. Chapter XIII, "The
Civil War, 1861-1865~ contains two sections on
Union and Confederate diplomacy: "The United States
and Europe," and "Diplomatic Efforts of the Southern Confederacy."
Handlin, Oscar, et. al., editor. Harvard Guiue to American History:- Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap-Press;

1954.

Chapter 18 contains a major section on the
Civil War and international relations. The Harvard Guide ranks with Bemis and Griffin's work
ru;;-t'he criteria for American bibliographic aids.
Nevins, Allan, et. al., euitor.
Critical.Bihliograph~.

Lu.:
11

1.~.u. ~ress,

1 67.

Civil War Books: A
Baton Rouge,

2 volume67

Volume I contains a major section entitled
.Uiplomac;y," and Volume II treats on "The Confed-

eracy -- Government and :Politics." It is the most
current bibliography on t11e Civil war period and
it offers an excellent commentary on the works it
cites.
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